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Abstract 
How might we have to imagine the Middle East if there were a political 
thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia? Could Turkey leave NATO in the near 
future? What would happen if security-related EU databases were success-
fully hacked; if South Korea were to arm itself with nuclear weapons; or if 
an American woman were to head the United Nations? 
Of course, these situations, as explored in the SWP’s latest Foresight 
research paper, are only hypothetical. Why address them? Because unex-
pected events have abounded in international politics in recent years. Brexit; 
the election of Donald Trump as US President; and Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea are only the most striking examples. Science and politics should 
therefore ready themselves for likely future surprises. The Foresight research 
paper aims to assist with this. 
We cannot and do not want to predict the future. However, with the 
help of systematic foresight we can better prepare for unplanned situations. 
This means improving our view of conceivable – albeit unlikely – develop-
ments that would seriously impact on German and European foreign and 
security policy. It also includes reviewing previous expectations – as this 
research paper likewise tackles. What actually happened to the battery revo-
lution that was supposed to secure our power supply? Did the negotiation 
process on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU unfold as experts had antici-
pated? Such reviews are instructive, and can be used to gain insights for 
the future. 
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 5 
This study is the fifth SWP publication to present 
foresight situations.1 It should be emphasised from 
the outset that, despite this considerable experience, 
we still do not claim to know what will happen in 
the future. We interpret foresight as dealing with 
hypothetical future situations from a scientific basis 
so as to better survey the broad spectrum of possible 
developments. SWP thereby practices a scientifically 
based or grounded foresight of possible future situa-
tions or developments that would be highly relevant 
to German and European foreign and security policy. 
In its practical application, this entails describing 
the development of each foresight situation so care-
fully that the story is in itself plausible and consist-
ent. Then it involves analysing, according to scientific 
standards, the initial assumptions and interrelation-
ships that characterise the situations – in as far as 
this is feasible for hypothetical cases. Thus, the most 
important factors that would significantly influence 
the situation are identified and examined, wherever 
possible with reference to general or specialised 
literature. We are particularly interested in situations 
which – although not necessarily at the centre of 
the forward-looking analysis of German and Euro-
pean policy – we assume could have a considerable 
impact on their foreign and security policy should 
 
* Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: 
The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: Crown Publishers, 
2015), 141. 
1 Thus far, the following SWP research papers have been 
published with foresight contributions: Expect the Unex-
pected. Ten Situations to Keep an Eye On (ed. Volker Perthes 
and Barbara Lippert, 2012); Ungeplant bleibt der Normallfall. 
Acht Situationen, die politische Aufmerksamkeit verdienen (ed. 
Volker Perthes and Barbara Lippert, 2013); Unexpected, 
Unforeseen, Unplanned. Scenarios of International Foreign 
and Security Policy. (ed. Lars Brozus, 2016); Conceivable 
Surprises. Eleven Possible Turns in Russia’s Foreign Policy 
(ed. Sabine Fischer and Margarete Klein, 2016). 
they occur unexpectedly.2 Thus, we aim to provide a 
specifically valuable insight by describing the possible 
consequences of these situations and developments, 
and to give corresponding recommendations for ac-
tion, particularly in situations that we believe deserve 
greater political attention despite a small chance 
of being realised. This applies both to any nasty sur-
prises and to events that would certainly have posi-
tive effects. 
Political Surprises and 
Scientific Innovations 
Unsurprisingly, various unforeseen developments 
have shaped international politics since the last two 
SWP research papers with foresight contributions 
were published in 2015/2016. From the current per-
spective, the biggest and possibly most significant sur-
prises were the British vote for EU withdrawal and the 
election of Donald Trump as President of the USA.3 As 
with comparable situations in the past, for example 
the Arab uprisings in 2010/2011, they provoked in-
tense soul-searching, both in politics and academia. 
Why were these serious events not anticipated? Could 
we have prepared sooner and/or better for them? How 
could similar future events be detected earlier? 
Such questions are fiercely debated in science as 
well as in politics. The scientific approach to future 
 
2 See Nikolaus von Bomhard: “In particular, events with 
potentially major effects should not be ignored in the risk 
analysis simply because their probability of occurrence is 
generally difficult to determine or relatively low,” quoted in 
“Schwarzer Schwan und Vogel Strauss”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 1 April 2016, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/die-
gegenwart/ krisenvorbeugung-schwarzer-schwan-und-vogel-
strauss-14148389.html (accessed 31 January 2018). 
3 The coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016 or the forced 
resignation of Zimbabwe’s long-time ruler Robert Mugabe 
in November 2017 could also be cited. 
Lars Brozus 
Introduction: Improving Foresight in 
Science and Politics 
»All scientific knowledge is tentative. Nothing is chiseled in granite.«  
Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner* 
Lars Brozus 
SWP Berlin 
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developments – future studies – aims to achieve 
higher quality research about the future through im-
proved collection and evaluation of data. As well as 
quantitative aspects – more and better data – quali-
tative questions are also at stake. What individual 
and collective dispositions and abilities contribute to 
the gradual improvement of the quality of research 
on the future, and how can these be used and further 
developed?4 The aim is to discover which characteris-
tics and working methods distinguish those analysts 
who make more accurate statements about the future. 
Methodological innovations such as greater transpar-
ency concerning the degree of accuracy of previous 
statements on the future are another example. 
It would certainly be desirable to know more about 
which methods and procedures facilitate particularly 
good statements about the future. This is undoubted-
ly useful, not least to politicians. The government and 
administration of the Federal Republic of Germany 
have openly expressed their intention to act effectively 
and with foresight.5 In recent years, almost all minis-
tries have devoted more attention to future-oriented 
analyses so as to be able to react better to surprises.6 
This becomes apparent institutionally with the setting 
up of units dealing, for example, with early crisis 
detection and scenario planning. Corresponding state-
ments can also be found in the major strategy papers 
of the departments primarily responsible for inter-
national affairs.7 To ensure that these declarations 
 
4 See Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting (see asterisk 
note, p. 3). 
5 See coalition agreement of 2013: “The coalition accepts 
the task of increasing the effectiveness of the government's 
actions in a targeted manner and, for this purpose, it will 
work out an interdepartmental strategy for ‘governing effec-
tively and far-sightedly’. […] We will strengthen the skills 
and capabilities for strategic forecasting in the ministries, 
the better to detect opportunities, risks and dangers of 
medium- and long-term developments”, quoted in Shaping 
Germany’s Future, Coalition treaty between CDU/CSU and SPD (Non-
Official translation by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), February 2014, 
p. 98. The coalition agreement of 2018 also calls for streng-
thening the strategic analytical capabilities of foreign, 
security and development policy. 
6 See Nels Haake, Governing Uncertainty. Strategische Voraus-
schau als Katalysator zukunftsorientierten Denkens und Politik-
gestaltens in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik? (University Pots-
dam: unpublished Masters Thesis, 2017). 
7 For example, in “Weißbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik 
und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr” (overall responsibility: 
Federal Ministry of Defence), in the 2017 government report 
“Entwicklungspolitik als Friedens- und Zukunftspolitik” 
have operational consequences, investments have 
also been made to develop the skills necessary for 
forward-looking governance. For example, civil 
servants can broaden their training in strategic fore-
sight. Such opportunities are in great demand 
throughout the government. 
In order to further political acceptance for inno-
vative approaches to foresight, the quality of the 
underlying research must be assured. Standards and 
quality criteria, which are developed and applied 
by the scientific community itself, are an important 
benchmark for policymakers.8 However, there is still 
a considerable distance from enhanced future studies 
to a policy that actually translates greater foresight 
competence into operational action. If, on the de-
mand side, politics remains attached to traditional 
patterns of organisation and bureaucratic action, 
even the best supply of foresight would be of little 
use. Within politics, this means thinking about a shift 
in organisational cultures and working methods 
beyond the approaches described above. This is neces-
sary to ensure that the overtures do not remain mere 
lip-service towards more forward-looking govern-
ance.9 
At the same time, it is important not to inflate ex-
pectations of the scientific study of the future. Even 
with the most elaborate concepts and methods of 
foresight it would not be possible to fully anticipate 
future developments – which is not the claim made 
by our foresight contributions anyway.10 After all, 
there are fundamental scientific limits to knowledge 
about the future. Moreover, preventive political 
action can produce unintended side effects and thus 
 
(overall responsibility: Federal Ministry of Economic Coope-
ration and Development) or its guidelines “Krisen verhin-
dern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern” of 2017 (overall 
responsibility: Foreign Ministry). 
8 See Standards und Gütekriterien der Zukunftsforschung. Ein 
Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Praxis, ed. Lars Gerhold et al. 
(Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015). 
9 See Lars Brozus, “Mehr Wissenschaft für bessere Politik? 
Hürden, Optionen und etwas Evidenz”, PeaceLab 2016, 
9 November 2016, http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/ 
debatte/friedensforschung/article/mehr-wissenschaft-fuer-
bessere-politik-huerden-optionen-und-etwas-evidenz/ (accessed 
31 January 2018). 
10 From a political perspective, this would also only be 
somewhat desirable, as it would inevitably curtail their room 
for manoeuvre. See Lars Brozus and Oliver Geden, “Experten, 
Politik und Populismus”, Wirtschaftsdienst 97, no. 4 (2017): 
239–42. 
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new surprises, as can be readily seen in some regions 
of the world, such as the Near and Middle East. Expec-
tation management must therefore be pursued par-
ticularly by scientists. Nevertheless, this does not 
legitimise the policymakers’ refraining from forward-
looking analysis nor planning on a scientific basis.11 
Against this backdrop, the present foresight contribu-
tions invite us to adapt to conceivable developments 
and situations that are highly relevant for foreign and 
security affairs. 
Overview of Contributions 
The contributions in this research paper deal with 
very different situations, both thematically and geo-
graphically. They therefore highlight the many issue 
areas dealt with at SWP. The contributions are briefly 
introduced in the chronological order in which the 
hypothetical situations might occur. 
Turkey’s departure from NATO in the near future 
is the assumption of Rayk Hähnlein, Markus Kaim 
and Günter Seufert. They describe the growing aliena-
tion between long-term partners in the alliance, which 
is a prerequisite for such a step, and discuss possible 
consequences and counter measures. 
Matthias Schulze, Raphael Bossong and Marcel 
Dickow examine the political and social impact of the 
sabotage of databases relevant to the EU’s internal 
security. Their starting point is a massive cyber-attack 
in the spring of 2020, the origin of which cannot be 
determined. 
Stephan Roll and Azadeh Zamirirad describe a 
hypothetical rapprochement between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. Accordingly, far-reaching agreements would 
be reached between the two countries in the summer 
of 2020. The motives and prerequisites for this devel-
opment are analysed, as are the associated regional 
implications. 
A comprehensive reform of the United Nations, 
culminating in the nomination of the first female UN 
Secretary-General in 2022, forms the background to 
the foresight scenario of Lars Brozus. Surprisingly, the 
new Secretary-General is an American citizen, who is 
supported by China and Russia. 
How might Germany and the EU react if South 
Korea were to develop nuclear weapons? Hanns Gün-
ther Hilpert and Oliver Meier describe a situation 
 
11 See von Bomhard, “Schwarzer Schwan und Vogel 
Strauss” (see note 2). 
whereby Seoul withdraws from the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in the summer of 2022 and establishes its own 
nuclear deterrent capacities. 
Foresight Review 
The contributions by Kirsten Westphal and Nicolai 
von Ondarza discuss foresight situations that had 
been developed by them in 2013.12 Kirsten Westphal 
describes the intermediate stage towards the “beauti-
ful energy world of 2021”, in which the storage capac-
ities of batteries have been expanded to such an ex-
tent that renewable energy sources meet the demand 
for energy. Nicolai von Ondarza considers the actual 
path of the negotiations between Great Britain and 
the EU concerning Brexit, which he took as a hypo-
thetical starting point in his 2013 contribution. 
This kind of review serves to further ameliorate 
our approach of a scientifically grounded foresight 
from both methodological and practical perspectives. 
Our aim is not to make more accurate predictions. 
Nevertheless, it makes sense to deal with past state-
ments in order to increase the quality of assumptions 
about the future. Analysts should therefore regularly 
reflect on how their previous view of potential future 
developments measure against reality. This includes 
questioning one’s own assumptions about relevant 
influential factors and causal relationships. The 
starting point for this is the current view of earlier 
descriptions of the situation. What were the funda-
mental statements at that time? Where is there con-
tinuity with the present, where are the differences? 
Have new factors been added, have others lost im-
portance? Taking these issues into account can 
improve the quality of future studies.13 
The foresight review also makes it possible to 
amend statements about the future to shifting con-
textual conditions in the real world. The context of 
the two foresight reviews presented here include the 
sharp drop in fossil fuel prices since 2013, and the 
 
12 See Kirsten Westphal, “Schöne Energiewelt: Die ‘Batte-
rie-Revolution’ vorantreiben”, and Nicolai von Ondarza, 
“Brüssel und London vor dem Scheidungsanwalt: Das Manage-
ment eines britischen EU-Austritts”, both in Ungeplant bleibt 
der Normalfall. Acht Situationen, die politische Aufmerksamkeit ver-
dienen, ed. Volker Perthes and Barbara Lippert, SWP-Studie 
32/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Septem-
ber 2013), 7–11, 16–19. 
13 See Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting (see asterisk 
note, p. 3). 
Lars Brozus 
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political marginalisation of UKIP, the party that 
championed Brexit most vehemently in the UK. This 
is another important step towards improving both 
the method and practice of foresight. Both reviews 
therefore dare to update on possible future develop-
ments – against the backdrop of what has happened 
in the meantime. 
Scientifically Grounded Foresight: 
Conceptual Background and Methodical 
Approach 
In SWP’s interpretation, scientifically grounded fore-
sight refers to a process aimed at analysing conceiv-
able future events and developments that would be 
relevant to foreign and security affairs.14 They are 
not forecasts, because we cannot predict what will 
happen. We maintain that it is even rather unlikely 
that developments and events will take place exactly 
as described in the contributions to this volume. How-
ever, we can draw attention to conceivable situations 
that – were they to occur – would be of great politi-
cal interest to Germany and the EU. A forward-look-
ing foreign policy should therefore pay them due 
attention. 
Since the future cannot be predicted, such state-
ments necessarily involve a high degree of uncertainty. 
Scientifically grounded foresight tries to master this 
uncertainty as far as possible, both conceptually and 
methodologically. Above all, this means explicitly dis-
closing the initial assumptions and cause-effect rela-
tionships characterising each hypothetical situation. 
This transparency is an essential prerequisite for the 
initial and eventual assumptions to be reviewed and 
problematized in retrospect from actual develop-
ments. It is an important benchmark for distinguish-
ing careful foresight from speculative guesswork. The 
systematic foresight review, which is represented in 
this research paper with two contributions, is there-
fore an additional quality feature of scientifically 
grounded foresight.15 
 
14 This section extends and updates the conceptual and 
methodical implementations in Lars Brozus, “Introduction: 
The Benefits of Scientifically Based Foresight”, in Unexpected, 
Unforeseen, Unplanned. Scenarios of International Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, ed. Lars Brozus, SWP Research Paper 1/2016 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016),  
5–10. 
15 The foresight review can also help you to perceive your 
own analytical “tunnel vision”. See Gary Saul Morson and 
Transparency is important for another reason. The 
hypothetical situations help to illuminate the “uni-
verse of imaginable possibilities” for political action 
(or omission).16 Yet it is inevitable that this universe 
is simultaneously shaped by the descriptions, because 
the analysts make a selection from all conceivable 
factors, variables, trends or influences. They concen-
trate on the factors central to their research focus and 
neglect others. For the reader, this means being con-
fronted with a pre-defined picture of the future that 
could influence their view of future developments. 
This makes a scientifically grounded and reflective 
approach essential: the scenarios need to be designed 
and worked out so that it is clear and transparent 
which factors were considered for what reasons. 
The scientific quality of the contributions is guaran-
teed by an elaborate selection and evaluation process. 
Initially, sketches of ideas were solicited throughout 
the institute. These sketches needed to deal with 
three concrete questions. First, what could happen? 
Second, why could it happen? Third, what would this 
mean for German and European politics and policy? 
The ideas submitted were presented and discussed 
at a workshop with more than thirty attendees from 
SWP’s research divisions. Three criteria were decisive 
for the debate: 1. consistency within the elaboration, 
2. plausibility of the argument, 3. originality and rele-
vance of the contribution.17 It cannot be over-stressed 
that the probability of each situation actually un-
 
Morton Schapiro, “Introduction: The Future of Prediction”, 
in The Fabulous Future? America and the World in 2040, ed. 
Gary Saul Morson and Morton Schapiro (Evanston, 2015), 
xv–xxix. 
16 See Philip E. Tetlock and Geoffrey Parker: “[C]urrent and 
future political choices can (and must) be made from a wide 
universe of possibilities and not from an overdetermined 
past that permits only one inevitable divisive response.” In 
idem, “Counterfactual Thought Experiments: Why We Can’t 
Live without Them & How We Must Learn to Live with 
Them”, in Unmaking the West: “What If” Scenarios that Rewrite 
World History, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow and 
Geoffrey Parker (Ann Arbor, 2006), 14–44 (27). 
17 The individual criteria are defined as follows: 1. Con-
sistency refers to the structure of the argument. Are the 
ideas stringently developed? Is the situation or development 
described coherent? 2. Plausibility refers to the persuasive-
ness of the sketch. This is an assessment of whether the 
situation described could occur – not whether it will actually 
occur. Is the described story plausible? 3. Originality and 
relevance of the case covers the political impact. Why should 
politicians deal with the situation described above? What 
options for action exist? 
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folding did not play a role in the assessment. From 
a foresight perspective, situations and developments 
with a high impact if they were to occur are particu-
larly relevant, even if the probability of their occur-
rence is estimated to be low (high impact – low 
probability). The workshop concluded with an evalu-
ation stage in which points were awarded for each 
sketch. The five highest rated sketches were subse-
quently elaborated into longer draft articles. The 
goal was to use a combination of critical analysis 
and unrestricted imagination to describe conceivable 
situations or developments that are in themselves 
convincing and plausible. Finally, the drafts went 
through two reviews, first by the editor or an expert 
researcher, and then by the director of the SWP. 
Rayk Hähnlein, Markus Kaim and Günter Seufert 
SWP Berlin 
Foresight 2018 
September 2018 
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During the jubilee summit meeting of the NATO 
member states, which is held in 2019 to celebrate the 
alliance’s creation 70 years ago, the Turkish president 
Erdoğan surprises the assembled heads of state and 
government. In the margins of the meeting he an-
nounces during a press conference with Turkish 
journalists that Ankara will leave the integrated 
command structure of the alliance. He reserves the 
right to take further steps, including a complete 
withdrawal from the alliance. In an interview with 
CNN a day later, Erdoğan explains the reasons. For 
some considerable time, Turkey’s importance and 
achievements have not been sufficiently acknowl-
edged by the other allies. Instead, they have inter-
fered in Turkey’s internal affairs and have not pro-
vided adequate support for the fight against terrorists. 
The direct military confrontation with the USA in 
Northern Syria in 2018, during which 24 Turkish 
soldiers died, was the last straw. While the capitals 
of some NATO countries receive the news somewhat 
fatalistically in the light of recent tensions, concerns 
about the political and military consequences 
dominate for other governments. 
Since 2013, the Turkish government 
has seen the Western world 
as a threat. 
Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. 
The training and equipment of the Turkish military is 
defined by Ankara’s close cooperation with Washing-
ton. Their cooperation has survived a number of 
serious conflicts. Serious fears that Turkey could leave 
the alliance have not arisen throughout these con-
flicts because important structural factors have secured 
cohesive relations between Ankara, the United States 
and NATO. Therefore, a fundamental break presup-
poses more than a specific conflict. Turkey would 
probably only do so after a fundamental reassessment 
of its security situation. Other prerequisites would be 
a tangible or supposed alternative option, and drastic 
upheavals in the military, in political parties and in 
public opinion. All these conditions exist today. 
Alienation from the West 
Since the protests around Istanbul’s Gezi Park in 
spring 2013, the Turkish government views the 
Western world as a threat. The demands of the young 
urban protestors received huge support in Western 
Europe and the USA. This left the government in 
Ankara with the impression that the West was going 
to question its legitimacy; it claimed that the protests 
were engineered from abroad to bring about a coup. 
When the Egyptian military overthrew President 
Morsi’s government in July 2013 and Western capitals 
tacitly accepted it, Ankara interpreted this as further 
confirmation that even moderate Muslim rule in the 
West was undesirable. The attempted coup of July 15, 
2016, and in particular the reaction of Western gov-
ernments, who were reluctant to condemn the coup 
immediately and who tended to place the Turkish 
government – not the rebels – at the centre of criti-
cism, completed this picture. 
Finally, the US does not extradite Fethullah Gülen, 
the “mastermind of the coup”, while Germany and 
other European countries grant political asylum to 
Turkish diplomats and military personnel suspected 
of belonging to his organisation. Although only the 
ruling AKP party believes that Western capitals are 
primarily targeting its power by supporting the rebels, 
when it comes to the Gülen movement all other 
parties represented in parliament are also highly sus-
picious, in particular of the USA and Germany.1 
 
1 On the Western-Turkish relations and their geopolitical 
consequences see Kemal Kirişci, Turkey and the West. Fault Lines 
in a Troubled Alliance (Washington, D.C., 2017). 
Rayk Hähnlein, Markus Kaim and Günter Seufert 
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The fear that the Kurds could divide 
the country has reached 
unprecedented proportions with the 
events in Syria and Iraq. 
In foreign policy, concerns about the preservation 
of the state’s territorial unity have affected almost all 
Turkish parties. This is triggered by the recurrent fear 
that the Kurds could divide the country – a fear that 
has reached unprecedented levels due to the events in 
Syria and Iraq. By rejecting Kurdish statehood in Iraq, 
the leading opposition party CHP and far right nation-
alists (MHP) are uniting with the government. The 
same is true of the endorsement of military actions 
preventing any form of Kurdish self-government 
in Syria. Since Washington arms the militias of the 
largest Kurdish party– a branch of the PKK – the 
current American policy is seen as an existential 
threat to the existence of the Turkish state. A large 
majority of the population shares this opinion: in 
2017, 79 percent of Turks viewed the USA negatively; 
72 percent regarded it as the greatest danger. In 2013, 
only 44 percent saw it this way.2 Approval of NATO 
is only at 23 percent, which is by far the lowest rate 
in the alliance.3 
Relations with the USA 
The relationship with the United States is of crucial 
importance for Turkey’s future in the Alliance. After 
Washington decided in October 2017 to temporarily 
suspend processing visa applications in response 
to the arrest of Turkish employees of American con-
sulates, bilateral relations have reached an all-time 
low. Never before had citizens of both countries been 
directly affected by conflicts between their govern-
ments. The consulate employees were arrested on 
the grounds that they were part of the network of 
Fethullah Gülen, the Turkish preacher living in the 
USA; Ankara has demanded his extradition. In early 
October 2017, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered 
 
2 See Henri J. Barkey, “How to Manage Post-Democracy 
Turkey”, The American Interest 13, no. 3 (September 2017): 
55–64 (61). 
3 In 2004, 67 percent of the population still considered 
NATO membership indispensable. In 2006, this figure had 
fallen to 41 percent. The current rejection is based on a 
resentment that has grown over time and is therefore con-
sequent. http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/37/ 
survey/aII/. 
the USA the release of a Protestant pastor imprisoned 
in Turkey. In exchange, the USA should transfer Gülen. 
This raised concerns in the USA about the danger of 
US citizens being taken hostage in Turkey.4 
The fact that Ankara’s and Washington’s goals in 
the Middle East have long ceased to coincide is, of 
course, even more significant. Disputes over tactics 
in the Syrian civil war, the degree of military support 
for jihadists and the use of Kurdish militias close to 
the PKK have grown over the years into a political and 
(since January 2018) military conflict between the two 
NATO partners in northern Syria. In the USA, the pre-
dominant view is that Erdoğan not only wants to 
shape the state and society of Turkey in an authoritar-
ian way, but also that he is determined to play an 
“anti-systemic role” against the West in foreign policy 
in the future.5 
Turkey’s Position in NATO 
No member of NATO denies Turkey’s great impor-
tance for the Alliance, but in many places impatience 
with Ankara is growing. In recent years Turkey has 
repeatedly called for Alliance solidarity, and not 
without success: in 2012 with the deployment of US, 
Dutch and German patriot missiles,6 in 2015 in the 
conflict with Moscow following the downing of a 
Russian fighter plane and in 2016 with an increased 
NATO presence in the air to monitor the Turkish-
Syrian border and Syrian airspace. NATO’s commit-
ment to Turkey reinforced Ankara’s long tradition 
of using Turkish membership as leverage in bilateral 
conflicts, not always accommodating the Alliance’s 
broad interests. It has used this leverage against the 
Republic of Cyprus, Israel, Austria and most recently 
Norway.7 
 
4 See Kadri Tastan, “A New Crack in an Old Alliance”, GMF 
– Transatlantic Take (October 2017), http://www.gmfus.org/ 
blog/2017/10/16/new-crack-old-alliance. 
5 Barkey, “How to Manage Post-Democracy Turkey” 
(see note 2), 3. 
6 See Markus Kaim and Günter Seufert, Deutsche Patriot-Rake-
ten in der Türkei. Symbolik statt Strategie, SWP-Aktuell 1/2013 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2013). 
7 In the NATO exercise “Trident Javelin”, which was held 
in Norway in November 2017, according to President Erdo-
ğan, he and the Turkish Republic founder Atatürk were 
listed in an overview as “enemies” and “targets”; Ankara 
then ordered the immediate withdrawal of the forty Turkish 
soldiers participating. 
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Approach to Russia 
In Turkey, in Ankara’s relations with the USA and the 
capitals of Western Europe, but also in NATO itself, 
certain dynamics are taking hold that undermine 
the mutual trust of the allies. Meanwhile, the govern-
ment of Erdoğan is strengthening cooperation with 
Russia, the state that has been perceived by many 
NATO member states since the Ukrainian crisis as the 
biggest security policy challenge of the Euro-Atlantic 
region. The strength of Ankara’s concerns over US 
policy in Syria, towards the Kurds and in the Middle 
East region becomes clear when you consider that 
Turkey usually fears Russian power projection in 
the Black Sea region and the Aegean. Furthermore, 
Turkey is heavily dependent on Russia in terms of 
energy, has no effective leverage against Moscow 
and should thus actually be wary of deepening this 
dependence. 
The provisional high point of Turkish-Russian 
cooperation is the acquisition of the Russian S-400 
missile defence system planned by Ankara.8 In 
Turkey, both government-oriented and opposition 
media see the decision to buy the system as proof of 
a strategic reorientation of their country.9 In many 
cases, Russia is no longer perceived as an enemy. 
The defence system is supposedly primarily directed 
against the “still-allies” from the West.10 Even those 
who do not share this view are worried that a greater 
number of Russian officers will be permanently 
stationed in Turkey in the future for the maintenance 
and operation of a system central to the security of 
the country. For Defence Minister Nurettin Canikli, 
the purchase of the S-400 is a major step on the way 
to an arms policy that is no longer unilaterally con-
 
8 See Rayk Hähnlein, Ein russisch-türkischer Raketendeal: Dop-
pelter Schaden für die Nato, SWP-Kurz gesagt (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2017), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/kurz-gesagt/ein-russisch-tuerkischer-raketendeal-
doppelter-schaden-fuer-die-nato, and Samuel Hickey, 
“Turkey’s New Missiles. What the S-400 Means for Ankara 
and NATO”, Foreign Affairs Snapshot, (October 2017), https:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2017-10-20/turkeys-
new-missiles. 
9 See Mete Yarar on 30 October 2017 in Karar, a newspaper 
close to the government; Orhan Bursalı on 18 September 
2017 in the opposition newspaper Cumhuriyet. 
10 See also the published list of possible targets of the sys-
tem by the official news agency Anadolu on 20 September 
2017, which contains only Western flight information. 
trolled by and dependent on the West.11 In this con-
text, Ankara’s alienation is growing within NATO, 
and the willingness to pass on sensitive information 
to Turkey is declining.12 
Differing interests and a loss of 
mutual trust characterise the 
relationships. 
Increasing isolation of Turkey in the Alliance, 
uncertainty in the capitals of Europe about Ankara’s 
intentions and the future extent of Turkish coopera-
tion with Russia, but also with Iran, and an increas-
ingly confrontational policy with the USA in the 
Middle East: all these indicate a deterioration in rela-
tions characterised by differing interests and a loss of 
mutual trust. The struggle for spheres of influence 
in Syria and Iraq – a region that Ankara regards as a 
key zone of its security interests because of the per-
ceived “Kurdish threat” – could become a rupture. 
Political disempowerment of the military 
and weakening of the “Atlanticists” 
Erdoğan’s government has used the unsuccessful 
coup as an opportunity to finally bring the military 
under its control. In the run-up to a series of mam-
moth trials – the best-known were “Ergenekon” and 
“Sledgehammer” – some 50 admirals and generals 
were arrested in 2011 alone, and in the same year 
the heads of all branches of the armed forces resigned 
together. At the time, cadres close to Gülen in the 
police and judiciary had cooperated closely with the 
government and weakened primarily Kemalist circles 
in the military. 
In response to the coup attempt, the government 
had fired several thousand soldiers by April 2017, and 
thousands more were detained. Although relatively 
few units took part in the coup attempt, 23,000 mili-
tary personnel (6,500 officers and 16,500 military 
cadets) were dismissed.13 The adoption of emergency 
 
11 See “Mit den S-400 ist eingetreten, was die Nato stets 
befürchtet hat” (in Turkish), Website of the newspaper 
Türkiye, 23 November 2017, http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com. 
tr/gundem/522113.aspx. 
12 See “Die Türkei ist kein vertrauenswürdiger Akteur 
mehr” (in Turkish), Deutsche Welle, 6 September 2017; “Eine 
Frage der Ehre”, Berliner Zeitung, 31 November 2017. 
13 Markus C. Schulte von Drach, “Tausende verdächtigt, 
gefeuert, verhaftet”, Süddeutsche Zeitung (online), 18 July 2017, 
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laws ensured that the military lost its previous posi-
tion as a “state within a state”. The Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff had to hand over extensive powers to the 
Minister of Defence, who since then now commands 
the armed forces, appoints their commanders and 
decides on the promotion of their officers. Military 
jurisdiction was abolished, the generals lost control 
of the political and ideological socialisation of the 
military juniors. The Coast Guard and Gendarmerie 
were placed under the Ministry of the Interior and 
the military was relieved of all police duties. 
Turkey’s withdrawal would 
fundamentally undermine the 
Alliance’s cohesion. 
During this period, not only “Gülenists” were dis-
missed, but also officers who could not be suspected 
of being close to Gülen, but who were critical of 
Erdoğan’s reconstruction of the Turkish state. Among 
them were many so-called Atlanticists who had com-
pleted parts of their training in the USA or in NATO 
and who have a positive attitude towards the alliance. 
Although many did welcome the fact that politics 
gained control of the military, the accompanying, 
targeted weakening of pro-Western cadres increased 
their concerns. 
Effects of Turkish Withdrawal on NATO 
and the West 
A withdrawal of Turkey from NATO would have far-
reaching consequences:14 
First of all, it would fundamentally undermine the 
political cohesion of the Alliance. Even if the with-
drawal would ultimately lead to a consolidation of 
NATO, the Alliance would initially have to enter a 
 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/tuerkei-tausende-
verdaechtigt-gefeuert-verhaftet-1.3587696. 
14 For a discussion of this scenario, see Michael Martens, 
“Eine Allianz fürs Leben. Die Türkei will die Nato ärgern. 
Verlassen will sie das Bündnis nicht”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, 11 June 2017; Luisa Seeling, “Der Partner, ein 
Feind. Ankara fühlt sich nach einem Eklat bei einer Militär-
übung auch von der Nato bedroht”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 
November 2017, and finally Metin Gürcan, “Nato als Feind? 
Eine türkische Perspektive auf das krisenhafte Verhältnis 
zwischen Türkei und Nato”, Internationale Politik und Gesell-
schaft, 23 November 2017, http://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/ 
aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/artikel/nato-als-feind-2442. 
phase of realignment which would result in a high 
degree of uncertainty. At a time when the Alliance 
has been called upon more than ever before in the 
last 25 years, NATO would become more inward-
looking after such a withdrawal, which would para-
lyze the institution for some time. Of great politically 
symbolic value would be the fact that for the first 
time a member would have left the alliance, which 
until then had only recorded accessions. The alliance’s 
overall cohesion would also be weakened because the 
threat perceptions would drift further apart. Turkey 
is one of the few NATO states in which security con-
siderations for both the eastern and southern flanks 
of the Alliance are important.15 This connects them to 
Germany, which because of its role in Europe and the 
fact that it is a target for refugee movements must 
also look to the east and south. In NATO, these states 
bring together particularly different threat percep-
tions, as can be seen time and again in the eastern 
and southern member states of the Alliance. 
Secondly, the withdrawal would severely weaken 
the Alliance’s operations. Geostrategically, Turkey’s 
situation is invaluable to the Alliance. Viewed from 
Europe, Turkey forms a bridge to the Near and Middle 
East, to the Caucasus and indirectly to Central Asia, 
and is thus an important stationing area. The Bos-
porus acts as maritime “hinge” to the Black Sea and 
its neighbours. As well as the Allied Land Command 
in Izmir, there are numerous other NATO facilities 
in Turkey. Allied troops can be moved with little ad-
ministrative, diplomatic and logistical effort. 
Thirdly, nuclear deterrence would also be affected. 
Like Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany, 
Turkey does not have its own nuclear weapons. How-
ever, like these states, it functions as a nuclear de-
fence posture and serves in this context as a station-
ing ground of the USA’s nuclear weapons. Turkey’s 
withdrawal would render obsolete all potential and 
actual geostrategic advantages for NATO arising from 
its position. The Alliance would have to laboriously 
renegotiate with Turkey on how to re-secure these 
benefits. 
Fourthly, Turkey’s withdrawal would weaken on-
going NATO operations and its overall defence capa-
bility: Turkey was involved, as part of its member-
ship, in a dozen NATO missions. Currently (March 
2018), the Alliance is involved in three major mis-
sions: “Resolute Support” in Afghanistan, Kfor in 
 
15 See Sinan Ülgen, Nato’s Southern Strategy at a Crossroads 
(Brussels: Carnegie Europe, December 2017). 
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Kosovo and “Sea Guardian” in the Mediterranean. 
Turkey, which after the USA has the most armed 
forces personnel in the alliance, contributes with 
significant contingents to all three. Nearly 700 Turk-
ish soldiers are currently deployed in Afghanistan 
and nearly 400 in Kosovo.16 In addition, Turkey has 
the seventh largest defence budget (US$12.118 billion, 
2017) and its defence spending also accounts for 
the seventh largest share of gross domestic product 
(1.48 percent in 2017) among the 29 NATO mem-
bers.17 Although the Turkish armed forces cannot 
claim uniqueness in terms of quality, President 
Erdoğan is pushing ahead with an ambitious tech-
nical modernisation of the armed forces. This in-
volves for example the medium-term equipment of 
the air force with F-35 jets or the national armament 
industry, which develops its own armed drones.18 
If Turkey were to withdraw, its contributions would 
have to be absorbed by the other member countries. 
Fifth, a withdrawal would politically strengthen 
the anti-Western camp, i.e. the group of states that 
reject “Western” ideas of domestic and foreign policy 
as alien to or actively opposed to their own cultural 
space. Turkey would be forced to compensate for 
the loss of strategic advantages offered by NATO by 
joining other alliances. Apart from the fact that the 
Shanghai Organisation for Cooperation (SCO), for 
example, would not give Turkey a similarly influen-
tial position in terms of either its degree of institu-
tionalisation or its membership structure as that 
which Ankara has in NATO, it does not seem entirely 
impossible for Ankara to lean towards or even be-
come a member of the SCO.19 
 
16 Turkish Armed Forces, General Staff, Contribution of 
the TAF to the Peace Support Operations, http://www.tsk.tr/ 
InternationalRelations/ContributionToTafToPeace. 
17 NATO, Information on Defence Expenditures (last updated 
15 March 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_ 
49198.htm. 
18 Turkey is not only a sales market, but also a cooperative 
partner of companies from other NATO member states for 
defence projects. One of the largest order volumes currently 
has the cooperation of Lockheed Martin and Turkish Air In-
dustries. The Turkish company manufactures fuselage centre 
sections for the F-35 Lightning II fighter jet. 
19 See Stephen Blank, “What Impact Would Turkish Mem-
bership Have on the SCO?”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (Wa-
shington, D.C.) 15, no. 8 (17 April 2013): 7–10, http://www. 
cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12705-
what-impact-would-turkish-membership-have-on-the-sco?. 
html. 
Recommendations for action 
1) The alliance should work, above all, to prevent the 
scenario presented here from occurring. This in-
cludes recognising that their interests and those of 
the Turkish government diverge, and looking for 
compromises. 
2) Part of this approach should be to differentiate 
between the continuing bilateral diverging inter-
ests of Turkey and individual states, and multi-
lateral cooperation within the Alliance. What bur-
dens German-Turkish relations must not affect 
NATO cooperation. 
3) If Turkey were to actually leave the alliance, NATO 
as an organisation and its member states would 
have to develop instruments to prevent Turkey’s 
rapprochement with the anti-Western camp. This 
requires a coherent transatlantic and pan-Euro-
pean policy on Turkey. 
4) To this end, it will be necessary to clarify as realis-
tically as possible what NATO and its member 
states strategically expect from Turkey under these 
new conditions and to what extent they can still 
have the ambitious right to exert a transformative 
influence on developments within Turkey. 
5) The long-term goal should be to institutionalise 
relations in a new way in the extreme case of a 
withdrawal from NATO. Such institutionalisation 
could not replace the binding effects of an alliance, 
but would be urgently needed to make future 
divergences of interest between NATO and Turkey 
manageable. 
6) NATO would be forced to see the withdrawal as an 
opportunity. In this sense, it could use this forced 
streamlining to strengthen its European pillar and 
advance its own capabilities more seriously than it 
has in the past. The European NATO states in par-
ticular would have to make even greater efforts to 
consolidate, integrate and develop their defence 
capabilities within the framework of other institu-
tions and approaches, such as the European Un-
ion’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
approach. 
In Turkey, those forces with an 
interest in close relations with the 
West should be strengthened. 
7) At the same time, those forces in Turkey that have 
an interest in close relations with the West should 
be strengthened. These include, for example, ex-
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port-oriented companies and entrepreneurs. This 
task of course exceeds NATO’s capabilities; it would 
have to be carried out by other organisations such 
as the EU, for example by modernising the customs 
union with Turkey. 
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On 25 October 2023, the European Parliament pre-
sented its preliminary investigation into the so-called 
“LISA hack”, the largest data theft in the history of 
the European Union. Since 2020, a foreign hacker 
group with considerable technical capabilities (Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat, APT) had infiltrated various 
interconnected EU databases for police and border 
control – including the Schengen Information Sys-
tem (SIS), the fingerprint database of asylum-seekers 
EURODAC, the Visa Information System (VIS), and the 
two newly established smart border systems, namely 
the European Travel Information and Authorisation 
System (ETIAS) as well as the biometric Entry and Exit 
System (EES). Over a prolonged period of time, mil-
lions of sensitive datasets from both EU and non-EU 
citizens had been compromised. At least 110 million 
SIS records and around 100 million biometric visa 
datasets were stolen. There were also indications that 
individual records had been manipulated. However, 
a conclusive forensic analysis was still pending. 
When experts of the EU Computer Emergency 
Response Team (EU-CERT) discovered the hack in 
spring 2022, the attackers triggered a so-called wiping 
module to delete most of the data stored by EU-LISA 
(European Agency for the Operational Management of 
Large IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice).1 Because the wider EU political crisis 
management was seen as inadequate, the European 
Parliament (EP) insisted on a formal committee of 
inquiry. Overall, the EU did not only suffer consider-
able reputational damage. Ever since the attacks, 
European border management and intra-European 
police and security cooperation have been severely 
impaired. 
 
1 European Union, “Europäische Agentur für das Betriebs-
management von IT-Großsystemen im Bereich Freiheit, 
Sicherheit und Recht (eu-LISA)”, europa.eu (online), 2017, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/eu-
lisa_de (accessed 19 December 2017). 
Chronology of the Hack 
That large government databases could become the 
target of advanced cyber operations became obvious 
in 2015 at the latest, when the American Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) was hacked. In this 
espionage operation, 21.5 million records from U.S. 
government personnel were stolen, including finger-
prints and security clearances.2 The OPM hack in-
dicated that foreign intelligence services were increas-
ingly interested in the ever-growing and networked 
governmental data registers on individual persons.3 
Since 2013, data protection and cyber security experts 
had warned that the growth and centralisation of 
critical EU security databases inspire attacks. For 
instance, there were already indications that hackers 
had broken into the Schengen Information System4 
and may have transmitted insider information to 
organised crime groups before. 
The 2022 cyber operation against EU-LISA had 
parallels with previous hacks. The attackers took 
advantage of the star-shaped topography of some 
older police databases managed by EU-LISA. In par-
ticular, national police authorities keep a local copy 
of the SIS data set, which is regularly mirrored on 
central servers of EU-LISA. In each member state, 
 
2 U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized 
Our National Security for More Than a Generation, 7 October 2016, 
https://oversight.house.gov/report/opm-data-breach-government- 
jeopardized-national-security-generation/ (accessed 19 De-
cember 2017). 
3 David Floyd, “Was I Hacked? Find out if the Equifax 
Breach Affects You”, Investopedia (online), 11 October 2017, 
http://www.investopedia.com/news/was-i-hacked-find-out-if-
equifax-breach-affects-you/ (accessed 19 December 2017). 
4 Ole Reißmann, “Hacker knackten Schengen-Datenbank”, 
Spiegel Online, 17 January 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/ 
netzwelt/netzpolitik/sis-hacker-kopierten-teile-der-schengen-
datenbank-a-944059.html (accessed 19 December 2017). 
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so-called SIRENE offices (Supplementary Information 
Request at the National Entry) manage this connec-
tion between local copies and the central EU-servers, 
while they also organise additional bilateral data 
transfers in case of a relevant “hit” (e.g. arrest warrant 
on a fugitive). This horizontal architecture supports 
police cooperation, but cannot ensure high levels of 
IT-security in all member states. In preparation for 
the attack, which apparently began in winter 2019, 
an employee of a southern European SIRENE office 
was bribed to share his access credentials with an 
unknown third party. Using the compromised user 
account, the attackers sent internal phishing e-mails 
and were thus able to obtain administrator authorisa-
tions privileges in the national SIRENE office. 
Manipulated PDF files (arrest warrants) were fed 
into the SIS via the captured SIRENE office on 20 
January 2020. Thus, additional computers were in-
fected with spyware. The malware spread throughout 
the SIS network, spied out the specifics of the central 
EU-LISA servers and enabled hackers to implant a 
back door into the increasingly interconnected archi-
tecture for EU police and border security information 
systems. About a month later, the hackers had gained 
administrative access to all centrally managed data-
bases, such as the VISA information system, EURO-
DAC, the Entry/Exit System and ETIAS. 
The retrospective forensic analysis showed that the 
malware had spread via standard network protocols, 
but also via USB sticks and could even infect air-gapped 
networks. In late 2018 EU-LISA had received a signifi-
cantly expanded mandate and was tasked to ensure 
the interoperability between existing and new EU 
border and police databases. EU-LISA subsequently 
recruited a large number of new staff and expanded 
its cooperation with private IT-subcontractors. This 
may have provided the attackers the opportunity 
to directly infiltrate EU-LISA. With administrator 
authorisations and manipulation of the log files, the 
perpetrators were able to remain undetected for a 
long time. The EP investigation concluded that the 
attackers succeeded in copying all EU databases over 
the course of 2020. 
Initially, the rising error rate did 
not attract attention because similar 
obstacles had been encountered 
in the past. 
By 2021, EU-LISA noted a rising number of erro-
neous data entries or discrepancies between national 
copies of the SIS and its central server image. Initially, 
the rising error rate did not attract much attention 
because similar obstacles had been encountered with 
system updates in the past.5 Moreover, the new bio-
metric Entry/Exit system caused implementation chal-
lenges, which appeared more pressing. EU-LISA staff 
actually expected that problems with data integrity in 
legacy systems could soon be solved more easily with 
the updated version. The plan was to create a fully 
interoperable system architecture, which would use 
biometric data to improve the accuracy of both old 
and new databases. In retrospect, this miscalculation 
prevented the intruders from being discovered earlier. 
While most cyber operations remain limited to 
skimming data, the perpetrators of the “LISA hack” 
took the next step to systematically manipulate data. 
Among other things, they changed the query algo-
rithm in such a way that certain biometric queries 
were answered with “no hit” even though a hit was 
present, and vice versa. Whereas users had the im-
pression that the system was functioning normally, 
this manipulation meant that wanted or otherwise 
registered persons were not detected during border or 
police checks. Instead, the number of false positives 
increased, so that innocent people were mistaken for 
criminals by security authorities at border entries. 
This led to a significant increase in complaints, while 
clearing the affected people from suspicion turned 
out to be very laborious – given that their details had 
to be cross-checked against an increasingly compro-
mised set of EU databases. 
The Attack is Discovered 
In March 2022, a good two years after the first infil-
tration of a national SIRENE unit, the EU-CERT recog-
nised the systematic nature of the irregularities. 
When the attackers, now deeply rooted inside the 
network, noticed their impending discovery, they 
executed a “wipe” command on 15 April, a Good 
Friday when many IT staff were on holiday. This 
command hit the management control servers of the 
EU-LISA in Strasbourg, deleting the centrally stored 
databases (SIS, VIS, EURODAC, ETIAS, EES) as well 
 
5 Detlef Borchers, “SIS II beginnt am 9. April trotz weiter-
hin vorhandener Mängel”, Heise Online, 18 March 2013, http:// 
www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/SIS-II-beginnt-am-9-April-
trotz-weiterhin-vorhandener-Maengel-1824520.html (accessed 
19 December 2017). 
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as the master boot record in order to slow down the 
investigations.6 The especially secure backup servers 
of EU-LISA in Austria were only partially affected, 
because they had already been quarantined as a 
precautionary measure by EU-CERT. 
At first, EU-LISA did not make this incident public, 
because the full extent of the damage had yet to be 
established. However, controls at Schengen borders 
slowed down drastically, which was explained by 
short-term technical difficulties. Border guards and 
police scrambled to respond, resorting to conventional 
document controls instead of biometric identity 
checks against IT systems, or simply waiving traffic 
through. Yet as this state of affairs stretched on for 
nearly two weeks, the large-scale IT attack could no 
longer be concealed. The director of EU-LISA went 
out of her way to reassure the public by stating that 
“according to our current investigations no data of 
EU citizens have been affected” and “all systems [...] 
will soon be completely restored”. 
The disclosure of search requests and 
covert alerts was a fiasco for internal 
security authorities. 
In the midst of this unfolding crisis, the attackers 
took a final step and publicly released large sections 
from the stolen EU security and border control data-
bases on the previously established Eu-Leaks.com 
website. In particular, the disclosure of search re-
quests and covert alerts on suspected terrorists in the 
SIS represented a fiasco for internal security authori-
ties. Moreover, investigative journalists discovered 
that parts of this sensitive police data had been ma-
nipulated, which explained the previous increase in 
complaints when innocent citizens became targeted 
by police measures. 
Conversely, this manipulation meant that the 
hackers could have also deliberately deleted entries 
in order to protect criminals from detection or pros-
ecution. This revelation led to a deep and lasting 
crisis of confidence in European security authorities. 
Serious suspicions or conspiracy theories started to 
spread. For instance, critics pointed to a recent series 
of unsolved murders of asylum-seekers across mem-
 
6 Sean Gallagher, “Shamoon Wiper Malware Returns with 
a Vengeance”, Ars Technica (online), 12 January 2016, https:// 
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/12/shamoon-
wiper-malware-returns-with-a-vengeance/ (accessed 19 De-
cember 2017). 
ber states that could have been connected to the ma-
nipulation of EU police databases. Dangerous agents 
could have infiltrated the Schengen zone unnoticed, 
while hostile external powers, which may be behind 
the cyber attack, might have benefited from EU data-
bases in order to locate dissidents abroad. 
Who was it? 
The operation could not be attributed to any par-
ticular actor, because criminal and state goals and 
methods overlapped too much. On the one hand, the 
know-how and resources required for the prolonged 
cyber-operation and the selection of targets hinted at 
a state-supported APT hacker group. From a technical 
point of view, the attackers used some known mal-
ware. For example, during the so-called Non-Petya-
Attack in Ukraine in 2017, a similar “wiper” had been 
used, presumably to disguise other espionage activ-
ities.7 From a tactical point of view, the publication of 
stolen and partially manipulated data was consistent 
with incidents observed during the 2016 US election 
campaign.8 On the other hand, it could not be ruled 
out that the attack was a false-flag or a smoke screen 
operation, as had been the case with numerous pre-
vious cyber attacks.9 In particular, the unusual data 
manipulation suggested other criminal motives. It 
was further speculated that hackers may have initially 
acted on behalf of a state, but then pursued their own 
interests. The breadth and scope of the final data 
leaks supported the hypothesis that the state-
sponsored hackers had gone rogue. 
 
7 Anton Ivanov and Orkhan Mamedov, “ExPetr/Petya/ 
NotPetya Is a Wiper, Not Ransomware”, Securelist (online), 
28 June 2017, https://securelist.com/expetrpetyanotpetya-is-a-
wiper-not-ransomware/78902/ (accessed 19 December 2017). 
8 “How Russia-linked Hackers Stole the Democrats’ Emails 
and Destabilised Hillary Clinton’s Campaign”, ABC (online), 
5 November 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-04/ 
how-russians-hacked-democrats-and-clinton-campaign-
emails/9118834 (accessed 19 December 2017). 
9 Lily Newman-Hay, “Hacker Lexicon: What Is the Attribu-
tion Problem?”, Wired (online), 24 December 2016, http:// 
www.wired.com/2016/12/hacker-lexicon-attribution-problem/ 
(accessed 19 December 2017). 
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We have clearly underestimated 
the dangers of digital manipulation 
with respect to our databases. 
Another large part of the leaked data consisted of 
millions of entries from the EU’s border control data-
bases (VIS, EES, ETIAS), including biometric passport 
photos, personal data and fingerprints from senior 
officials, celebrities and business leaders from coun-
tries around the world. Such sensitive personal infor-
mation about board members, secretaries of state or 
government officials with security clearances may 
not only have value to intelligence agencies, but 
could potentially be used for blackmail, industrial 
espionage and identity theft (cybercrime). In particu-
lar, biometric information, such as fingerprints, are 
increasingly used to access personal devices, online 
accounts and even high-security facilities, so that 
criminals could, in a worst-case scenario, copy im-
prints and successfully defraud high-value targets or 
steal highly sensitive information. 
Assigning Blame and Political 
Consequences 
Right-wing populist parties within the EU used the 
scandal to call for a massive increase in police per-
sonnel and an uncompromising return to national 
border controls. Left-liberal groups, in contrast, 
warned against the spread of uncontrolled data 
collection practices and a European “surveillance 
state”. However, political responsibility for the hack 
and its consequences remained very elusive in the 
EU’s complex system of governance. Only the leader-
ship of EU-LISA had to resign with immediate effect. 
This did little to dispel the distrust and to stop the 
mutual accusations that spread among European 
security authorities. Further projects for EU internal 
security cooperation and information-sharing were 
put on hold. 
Within a few weeks EU-CERT eventually managed 
to restore substantial parts of the EU databases from 
national copies and the backup server in Austria. 
However, the manipulation and public leaks of dif-
ferent datasets had been so substantial that a return 
to regular operations could not be guaranteed for 
years to come. It could also not be ruled out that the 
malware was still active or that the hackers had 
placed further hidden back doors. Against this back-
drop, EP’s committee of investigation came to the 
conclusion: “We have clearly underestimated the 
dangers of digital manipulation with respect to our 
databases”. IT security is not keeping pace with the 
speed at which states are expanding and networking 
sensitive datasets. The EU’s crisis management also 
came in for sharp criticism. Although there had been 
ample warnings about the danger of sophisticated 
cyber attacks in the past, the EU had failed to set up 
a comprehensive and effective crisis response mecha-
nism – as proposed by the authors of the EU Cyber 
Security Strategy as early as 2017. Furthermore, the 
EP criticised the overall trajectory of EU internal secu-
rity policy.10 Under the slogan of “interoperability” 
more and more databases had been linked up to-
gether without due consideration of the associated 
risks.11 Old vulnerabilities were neglected, while new 
attractive targets appeared in EU-LISA. Especially in 
the case of the police legacy system SIS, more serious 
investments in IT-security were neglected due to the 
argument that data protection must not lead to “of-
fender protection”. In concrete terms, this was mani-
fested in the failure to systematically encrypt all data 
entries and to maintain wide-ranging access rights via 
the national SIRENE offices with diverse security 
standards. 
In sum, it may no longer possible to 
control sensitive data profiles. 
In sum, the parliamentary report advocated greater 
restrictions on, or economical use of, data storage and 
“more responsible networking”. The integration of 
IT-systems should be downgraded, because it may no 
longer be possible to control sensitive data profiles 
that are aggregated from different sources. Further-
more, the data manipulations during the “LISA hack” 
demonstrated the need to regularly review the under-
lying information that leads to the classification of 
suspects or persons of interests for police and border 
guards. In any case, all affected citizens and third 
country nationals should have better rights of access 
and information to the stored information. To assume 
these tasks, the EP advocated strengthening existing 
data protection authorities, leading to the creation of 
 
10 Borchers, “SIS II beginnt am 9. April trotz weiterhin vor-
handener Mängel” (see note 5). 
11 Raphael Bossong, Intelligente Grenzen und interoperable 
Datenbanken für die innere Sicherheit der EU. Umsetzungsrisiken und 
rechtsstaatliche Anforderungen, SWP-Studie 4/2018 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2018). 
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new “Data Quality Managers”. In addition, the com-
mittee of investigation questioned economic argu-
ments for the introduction of more electronic police 
and border control systems. Following the large-scale 
wiping of data in 2022, member states had to fall 
back on human border and police officers to ensure 
a minimum level of security. The respective human 
resources had to be maintained for the future as well, 
contrary to previous plans for cost savings due to in-
creasingly automatised border control procedures. 
Finally, there must be clear lines of political ac-
countability for cyber incidents and large data scan-
dals, including the timely and adequate provision 
of information to the general public. The technical 
nature of cyber attacks should no longer serve as an 
excuse to evade responsibility at the ministerial level, 
not least for structural policy failures when deciding 
upon new IT infrastructures and their governance. 
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“Mecca, 30 July 2020 (reuters): Saudi Arabia’s King 
Muhammad bin Salman will receive Iranian Presi-
dent Hassan Rohani in Mecca at the start of the 
‘Feast of Sacrifice’. The two countries seek to sign 
a number of economic agreements at the meeting. 
The following day Rohani and bin Salman will 
inaugurate the recently completed Jeddah Tower, 
now the tallest building in the world: a tribute to 
the guest that would have been unthinkable just 
a few months ago. 
Until March this year, Saudi Arabia and Iran did 
not maintain full diplomatic relations. Observers 
consider the current visit of the Iranian head of 
state to be historic. It marks the end of a Cold War 
between the two countries that fuelled various 
conflicts in the region. Riyadh and Tehran appear 
to have agreed on zones of influence and the main 
building blocks of a regional arrangement. Accord-
ingly, Syria and Lebanon could de facto fall within 
Tehran’s sphere of influence, while the Arabian 
Peninsula including Bahrain could be recognized 
as Saudi Arabia’s zone of interest. 
While some actors in the region welcome the newly 
established collaboration between Tehran and 
Riyadh as a gesture promoting peace, others see it 
as an alarming development marking the begin-
ning of a new era of Saudi-Iranian dominance in 
the region”. 
How It All Began 
In 2019, Riyadh and Tehran start seeking opportuni-
ties for joint coordination. In the run-up to the Hajj, 
the traditional pilgrimage to Mecca, Supreme Leader 
Ali Khamenei reaffirms once again the Muslim duty 
to achieve “unity” (vahdat) in the Islamic world. Two 
weeks later, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif declares vah-
dat the key strategic objective of a new neighbour-
hood policy. When Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the 
Iranian Supreme National Security Council, arrives 
for talks in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Sep-
tember, observers doubt that meetings are aimed at 
bilateral relations only. Saudi journalists speak of 
“back channel” talks with Riyadh that are said to 
have taken place in Abu Dhabi. 
Rumours of a rapprochement between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are confirmed in autumn 2019, when 
Tehran and Riyadh announce a “no regime change” 
policy for the Gulf at the sidelines of the meeting of 
foreign ministers of the Organisation for Islamic Co-
operation, reassuring each other that they will stay 
out of their respective internal affairs. Observers 
speak of a Saudi-Iranian non-interference pact aimed 
at defusing the mutual accusations that Tehran pro-
vides arms to the Shiite minority in the Saudi prov-
ince of al Sharqiyya and that Riyadh supports Sunni 
extremists in the Pakistani and Iranian territories of 
Baluchistan. 
Israeli media outlets, however, warn against such 
an arrangement. Israel continues to see Iran as an 
existential threat and to pursue a policy of isolation 
towards the country. The changing situation is a stra-
tegic challenge for the new Israeli government under 
Prime Minister Yair Lapid who has already discussed 
the matter in a phone call with US President Donald 
Trump. In light of the forthcoming presidential elec-
tions and the generally assumed change in the White 
House, observers expect Washington to take a wait-
and-see stance. 
News of an imminent “grand bargain” between 
Tehran and Riyadh spark heated public debates all 
across the region. Sceptics refer to the sectarian divide 
that has opened up in recent years between Shia and 
Sunni Muslims. Still, many citizens are quickly cer-
tain that a regional arrangement is only a matter of 
time. 
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Motivation of the Actors 
The gradual reduction of tensions between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran follows a rational cost-benefit cal-
culation. Major political, economic and social chal-
lenges convince leaders in Riyadh and Tehran that 
national goals can be better achieved through limited 
rivalry rather than open provocation. In previous 
years, neither side has succeeded in decisively reduc-
ing the regional influence of its rival. The danger of a 
military escalation between the two states has rather 
increased. Tehran and Riyadh also face considerable 
political and economic costs arising from their activi-
ties in military conflicts such as in Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen. Finally, the region’s long-standing potential 
for escalation is an obstacle to investments and sub-
stantial economic reforms overdue in both countries. 
Tehran and Riyadh face considerable 
political, economic and 
social challenges. 
When Muhammad bin Salman was appointed 
Crown Prince in 2017, effectively taking over political 
leadership in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia was entering a 
difficult phase of consolidation. The country is under 
stress economically and bin Salman’s domestic posi-
tion is not yet secure. Fundamental structural reforms 
are pending. The Crown Prince’s ambitious Vision 
2030 transformation plan aims to strongly diversify 
the economy in order to reduce its oil dependency. 
Implementing these reforms, however, requires a 
stable political environment to generate a much 
higher inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI). In 
addition, the Kingdom’s defence spending has in-
creasingly burdened the public budget. Warfare in 
Yemen alone is estimated to cost the kingdom five to 
six billion US dollars per month.1 Overall, the Saudi 
Central Bank was forced to use up almost a third of 
its monetary reserves between 2014 and 2017.2 Yet, 
an exit strategy for Yemen is still not in sight. At the 
 
1 See Bruce Riedel, “In Yemen, Iran Outsmarts Saudi 
Arabia Again”, Markaz (Brookings), 6 December 2017, https:// 
www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/06/in-yemen-iran-
outsmarts-saudi-arabia-again/. 
2 See “Saudi Foreign Reserves Rise in October as Budget 
Deficit Outlook Improves”, Reuters, 28 November 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-cenbank-reserves/saudi-
foreign-reserves-rise-in-october-as-budget-deficit-outlook-
improves-idUSL8N1NY5KQ. 
same time, Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Iran’s 
growing influence in the region and its political 
ambitions. Riyadh sees Tehran’s regional activities 
and the potential establishment of an Iranian transit 
corridor leading through Iraq and Syria to the Medi-
terranean Sea as expansionist aspirations of its arch-
rival. However, all attempts to curb Iranian influence, 
especially in Iraq and the Levant, have so far been 
unsuccessful. 
Iran also faces considerable challenges. The coun-
try has been able to significantly expand its geopoliti-
cal scope of action since 2003. At the same time, 
despite the nuclear agreement, the economic develop-
ments have not met the expectations of the govern-
ment or the population. According to official figures, 
the unemployment rate has risen to more than twelve 
percent with women and young people most fre-
quently affected.3 However, unemployment is likely 
to be much higher in many Iranian provinces. The 
pressure on President Hassan Rohani to deliver results 
has grown noticeably. Discontent about the economy 
and dissatisfaction with politics, among other things, 
were evident in the nationwide protests at the turn 
of 2017/2018, which questioned not only the govern-
ment, but the entire state apparatus. On the foreign 
policy front, uncertainty about the fate of the nuclear 
agreement after Washington has pulled out and 
ceased to stick to its commitments, is exerting enor-
mous pressure. This uncertainty hampers much-
needed foreign investment in Iran. Furthermore, 
Iran’s military activities in Syria and Iraq have proved 
costly. Iran’s intervention in Syria alone is estimated 
to cost Tehran several billion US dollars a year.4 In 
view of the nationwide economic hardship, popular 
support for further regional expenditures is not to 
be expected. Meanwhile, Tehran has become a focal 
point of American security policy. Trump’s visits to 
Riyadh and Tel Aviv and his call for a regionally co-
ordinated isolation policy towards Iran have been met 
with concerns in Tehran about a trilateral alliance 
between the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Islamic 
Republic has a vested interest in preventing a united 
front against Iran led by regional actors. 
Lastly, the foreign policy of individual states within 
and vis-à-vis the region has become less predictable 
 
3 See Statistical Centre of Iran, A Selection of Labor Force 
Survey Results. The Year 1395 (2016–2017), https://www.amar. 
org.ir/Portals/1/releases/LFS_Year_1395.pdf. 
4 See “Syria: The Story of the Conflict”, BBC, 11 March 
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 
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and threat perceptions have increased. The crises 
around Qatar (starting June 2017) and Lebanon (in 
November 2017) came as a surprise to most observers 
in the region. With the isolation of Qatar, the cracks 
in the alliance of Arab states invoked by Trump came 
to light. Meanwhile, Riyadh has also questioned the 
reliability of its American partner and its regional 
policy. Following the decision by the Trump admin-
istration in December 2017 to move the US embassy 
to Jerusalem, the Saudi leadership was forced to criti-
cise Washington because of the anti-Israeli sentiment 
prevailing among its own population. The growing 
uncertainty increases the risk of a worst-case scenario 
for both Saudi Arabia and Iran: an unintended direct 
military confrontation from which neither side can 
emerge victorious. 
Geopolitical Changes and Impacts on 
the Region 
An agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia on 
regional zones of influence could have a stabilising 
effect on the Gulf and the wider region. However, an 
immediate settlement of existing conflicts can hardly 
be expected. 
In Yemen, for example, it could become much 
easier for Saudi Arabia to refrain from military at-
tacks in the future if Iran credibly ended using any 
influence it has on the conflict. Riyadh could finally 
acknowledge the Huthis for what they are, namely 
an indigenous Yemeni movement and not a “proxy” 
of Tehran. The conflicts among the Yemeni parties 
would still be far from resolved. However, an intra-
Yemeni understanding, such as a ceasefire agreement, 
would be easier to reach. 
The conflict with Qatar could also ease. Ostensibly, 
Iran plays only a minor role here. The Arab alliance 
led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
which imposed a partial blockade on the emirate in 
June 2017, justified its actions primarily with Doha’s 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamic groups. More likely however, the driving fac-
tor for Saudi Arabia’s aggressive action against the 
emirate was its proximity to Iran. In recent years, 
Qatar had gradually expanded its relations with Iran, 
with which it shares and exploits a natural gas field, 
and thus moved away from Saudi policy towards 
Tehran. If this cause of conflict disappears, it could 
become much easier to find a face-saving solution 
for all sides and to lift the partial blockade. 
Recognizing zones of influence could also lead 
to Saudi-Iranian cooperation in Iraq to stabilise the 
country and its political order. Riyadh and Tehran 
share an interest in curbing Iraqi regional ambitions 
in the long run. Both sides could use their clout over 
the two most important Shiite militias, the Badr 
organisation close to Tehran and the Riyadh-friendly 
militia around the Sadr family, to place them under 
de facto state control. This would facilitate a function-
ing national unity government in Baghdad that also 
includes Sunnis. Iranian-Saudi cooperation is conceiv-
able under the condition of a demilitarised zone in 
the south which would keep Shiite militias affiliated 
with Iran at a distance from the Saudi border. 
In the Syrian conflict, Riyadh could give up oppos-
ing Iran’s participation in international forums for 
conflict resolution. While a solution to the conflict 
would still be a long way off, international negotia-
tions could gain momentum as a result. In Lebanon, 
on the other hand, the end of Saudi influence could 
also mean an end to the political role of the Hariri 
family, which has received considerable financial 
support from Riyadh in the past. Whether Hezbollah, 
closely allied with Tehran, would turn into an all-
dominant political force, however, is highly uncer-
tain. Greater influence of Iran in Lebanese politics, 
to expand relations between Beirut and the Assad 
regime in Damascus for instance, could trigger strong 
social and political opposition domestically. Thus, 
even without Saudi influence on Lebanese politics, 
Tehran would have to act with extreme caution. 
A regional arrangement could 
rapidly accelerate economic 
development in the Gulf. 
While a regional arrangement would have medi-
um- and long-term repercussions for regional con-
flicts, it could rapidly accelerate economic develop-
ment in the Gulf. There would be greater leeway for 
broad economic cooperation from which Iran and 
Saudi Arabia as well as the smaller Gulf monarchies 
could benefit equally. 
Despite political tensions, numerous economic 
ties between Iran and the smaller Gulf states already 
exist. The UAE is the second most important market 
for Iranian exports after China, and Oman is already 
planning to import Iranian natural gas through a 
pipeline system running in the Persian Gulf. Saudi 
Arabia could also take advantage of cheap Iranian 
natural gas imports and thus partially substitute its 
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consumption of crude oil, for which higher prices 
can be achieved on the world market.5 In addition, 
all Gulf countries would benefit from Iranian food 
exports, which would likely be cheaper than the cur-
rently dominant imports from Asia and Europe, given 
shorter transport routes. 
Iran, on the other hand, could profit from Gulf 
state investments. Iran’s capital-intensive petrochemi-
cal industry in particular, which is highly developed 
in the neighbouring monarchies, urgently needs for-
eign investments. Ultimately, the entire Gulf could 
become much more attractive to international inves-
tors in the face of increased political stability and a 
larger market, all having a positive impact on the 
investment climate. 
Regionally and internationally, the rapprochement 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have both win-
ners and losers. The biggest winner would likely be 
China. Reduced political tensions in the Gulf could 
facilitate Beijing’s “Belt and Road” initiative to build 
an intercontinental infrastructure network much 
more easily. Russia, on the other hand, would benefit 
from the diminished influence of the United States in 
the region, whose importance as a security guarantor 
for the Gulf monarchies would decrease. The US would 
have only limited room for manoeuvre to prevent 
Saudi-Iranian collaboration. Washington’s already 
fading clout over the Gulf states was evident during 
the Qatar crisis. In the event of rapprochement 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the US would try to 
maintain its remaining channels of influence. Thus, 
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council would 
likely continue to receive American security guaran-
tees and the presence of the US 5th fleet in the Gulf 
would be sustained. Meanwhile, Riyadh could try to 
counter political pressure from Washington through 
strategic arms purchases. 
Two regional powers, Turkey and Egypt, would 
find themselves on the losing end. Since 2016, Turk-
ish-Qatari relations have intensified and Ankara has 
been able to build a military base in the Persian Gulf. 
This has been neither in Tehran’s nor Riyadh’s inter-
est. They could combine efforts to curb Turkish activi-
ties in their immediate neighbourhood. Egypt might 
suffer if Riyadh further reduces its financial support 
for the country. One driving factor for the generous 
 
5 See Jean-François Seznec, Crude Oil for Natural Gas. Prospects 
for Iran-Saudi Reconciliation, Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: 
Atlantic Council, October 2015), http://www.atlanticcouncil. 
org/images/publications/Crude_Oil_for_Natural_Gas.pdf. 
financial aid to the administration under President 
Sisi was to keep the most populous Arab country at 
the Kingdom’s side in a possible conflict with Iran. 
However, Saudi Arabia’s willingness to transfer large 
sums of money to Cairo for this purpose is likely to 
decline in the event of détente with Iran. 
The new situation poses a 
strategic challenge to Israel. 
Israel would see security benefits from a less tense 
regional environment. A rapprochement between 
Tehran and Riyadh would reduce the risk of a de-
stabilised region through an Iranian-Saudi confronta-
tion that could make an Israeli intervention a neces-
sity. At the same time, even under changed regional 
conditions, Iran is unlikely to abandon its fundamen-
tal position vis-à-vis Tel Aviv: not recognizing the 
state of Israel and following a confrontational policy 
approach. A Saudi-Iranian regional arrangement 
would therefore continue to pose major security chal-
lenges for Tel Aviv, limiting its room for manoeuvre. 
Since the nuclear agreement reached with Iran in 
2015, the Israeli government had sought to close 
ranks with Saudi Arabia. However, closer security 
cooperation between Tel Aviv and Riyadh would be 
highly unlikely with an Iranian-Saudi rapproche-
ment. In addition, decreasing regional pressure would 
allow Tehran to concentrate on consolidating its 
Western zone of influence. A further increase of 
Iranian influence in Israel’s immediate neighbour-
hood would be perceived as an existential threat in 
Tel Aviv. This is likely to fuel tensions on Lebanon’s 
southern border in particular, thus increasing the 
danger of limited escalation through armed conflict. 
Implications for Germany and the EU 
From the perspective of Germany and the EU, im-
proved relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
would be welcome in principle, as they reduce the 
risk of a military escalation. Notwithstanding the 
benefits, a regional arrangement between Riyadh and 
Tehran would increase concerns about unrestrained 
foreign policy behaviour by the two actors, as they 
could use their newly established zones of influence 
to expand their respective scope of action in the 
region. 
German and European policy options remain 
limited for the time being. Berlin and Brussels would 
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not have effective political and economic levers at 
their disposal to curb regional ambitions of the 
actors. Germany would be particularly alarmed by 
the shift of power in the Levant and its implications 
for Israel. Here, the potential for escalation is notably 
high. Berlin should use its political channels to Israel 
and the Islamic Republic to reach for a code of con-
duct between the two states.6 An agreement based on 
a non-aggression principle for both sides would need 
to include informal rules of engagement for Iranian 
or Iranian-backed forces in Syria and Lebanon. The 
process of mediation could in itself help reduce the 
risk of military confrontation. 
The scenario of a regional arrangement would also 
offer opportunities for political action. Security 
issues, including arms control mechanisms, ballistic 
missile testing or the production of weapons of mass 
destruction, could be discussed in a regional context. 
Past approaches, such as the idea of a weapons of 
mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) for the Gulf 
could be revived, possibly serving as a starting point 
for a WMDFZ in the entire region, including Israel 
and mediated by Europe. Talks could be part of a 
larger Gulf security dialogue. Germany and the EU 
could support this process both diplomatically and 
in practice, particularly in areas where Berlin and 
Brussels have varied experience, such as in maritime 
security. 
Saudi-Iranian rapprochement 
could bring Germany and the EU 
closer to Turkey again. 
Saudi-Iranian rapprochement could also bring 
Germany and the EU closer to Turkey. Ankara might 
be tempted to compensate for its diminishing influ-
ence in the Middle East by turning towards Europe. A 
more intensive cooperation with Ankara should focus 
on stabilising political order in the region, not least 
because fragile statehood opens up considerable op-
portunities for actors with hegemonic aspirations as 
well as jihadist movements. 
However, détente between the Islamic Republic 
and the Saudi Kingdom should not mask the fact that 
the decades-long rivalry between the two states would 
 
6 See Gil Murciano, Israel vis-à-vis Iran in Syria: The Perils of 
Active Containment, SWP Comment 41/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2017), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/israel-and-irans-growing-influence-
in-syria/ (accessed 23 April 2018). 
likely continue. Even in such a scenario, numerous 
disagreements would remain, including the dispute 
over the naming of the Gulf, support for Sunni and 
Shiite militias in the region, which might no longer 
be used as “proxies” but still function as allies, and 
an inherent claim to lead and represent the Islamic 
world. Lastly, despite its subordinate importance for 
Saudi-Iranian competition, the Shiite-Sunni divide is 
unlikely to be easily quelled in public perception. 
German and European foreign policy 
should include the Gulf as a political 
entity in strategic calculations. 
A rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran, 
which could lead to an arrangement between the two 
powers, should be taken into account in strategic 
security calculations given its far-reaching regional 
and geopolitical repercussions. Germany and the 
EU should therefore not only take the effects of a 
military escalation into consideration, but also the 
consequences of a rapprochement. To this end, it is 
necessary to think about Gulf policy not in the con-
text of bilateral relations first and foremost, but to 
include the Gulf in its political entirety in strategic 
calculations. This would serve as a basis for a German 
and European Gulf policy that can weigh various 
options of power politics and place the entire sub-
region at the centre of political measures. 
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When the new Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (UN) took office in New York on 1 January 
2022, the response in politics and the media was as 
great as it was divided. This is not only because for 
the first time a woman will lead the UN. Almost more 
attention concerns her nationality. The Secretary-
General is a U.S. citizen. This violates the unwritten 
rule that the permanent members of the Security 
Council – the “Permanent Five” (P5) – do not hold 
the top position in the organisation.1 Obviously, 
however, this time it’s different. 
Critics fear that the concentration of power in the 
hands of the already privileged P5 is likely to increase 
further. After all, the P5 are the only states with the 
right to veto Security Council resolutions. When con-
sidering the Secretary-General’s inauguration, some 
observers even speak of an “unfriendly takeover” or 
an open oligarchisation of the UN. They are alarmed 
that the legitimacy of the world organisation might 
suffer. It must be remembered: in the second main 
UN body, the General Assembly, all Member States 
have equal voting rights, irrespective of population, 
geographical size, economic strength or contributions 
to the budget of the organisation. Therefore, the P5 
cannot be sure that unfavourable decisions can be 
prevented there.2 Although even sceptical observers 
know that resolutions of the General Assembly are 
not binding, they point to their high symbolic sig-
nificance. 
 
1 Permanent members of the Security Council are China, 
France, Russia, the UK and the USA. 
2 In December 2017, for example, the General Assembly 
condemned with a large majority Washington’s decision to 
relocate the American Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. See 
“US Will ‘Take Names of Those Who Vote to Reject Jerusa-
lem Recognition’”, The Guardian, 20 December 2017, https:// 
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/20/us-take-names-
united-nations-vote-to-reject-jerusalem-recognition (accessed 
26 January 2018). 
Other observers welcome the appointment of the 
new Secretary-General. On the positive side, this is 
the first time a woman has filled the position. Fur-
thermore, sympathetic commentators hope that the 
far-reaching reforms initiated by the outgoing UN 
Secretary-General António Guterres will now have the 
desired effect. The aim of the “Guterres reforms” is to 
increase the UN’s speed of action and assertiveness. 
Their “Byzantine procedures” (Guterres) are to be sim-
plified by bundling more competencies into fewer 
decision-making units.3 In the area of peace and secu-
rity, the three departments responsible to date have 
been merged into two new units – a department for 
operational control of UN peacekeeping missions and 
a department for political tasks.4 Simultaneously, 
Guterres recommended improving working methods 
and the organisational culture at the UN. To this end, 
responsibilities are to be assigned more clearly, co-
operation between the numerous actors in the UN 
system strengthened and the scope for decision-mak-
ing for organisational units outside the headquarters 
increased. Furthermore, the previous Secretary-Gen-
eral worked to achieve gender parity, especially in the 
filling of top management positions.5 
 
3 See António Guterres, “Remarks at UN Reform Event”, 
18 September 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/ 
speeches/2017-09-18/secretary-generals-reform-remarks 
(accessed 28 January 2018). 
4 See Tanja Bernstein, Reforming the United Nations’ Peace 
and Security Pillar, ZIF Policy Briefing (Berlin: Center for Inter-
national Peace Operations, December 2017). 
5 See “United Nations Management Reforms ‘a Matter of 
Urgency’, Secretary-General Stresses, Presenting Restructur-
ing Proposals to Fifth Committee”, United Nations Press 
Release SG/SM/18810-GA/AB/4260, 4 December 2017. 
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America’s commitment to UN reform 
is one of the biggest political 
surprises of recent years. 
Of course, the UN has already seen many reform 
plans come and go. Often, the projects fail because 
of a lack of support from the Member States. Many 
of them see the UN primarily as an executive body, 
which should take into account both their diverse 
and often contradictory individual interests. Appro-
priate organisational action is not always in the fore-
ground. “Rather secretary than general”, is an often 
used characterisation of the top office. However, 
Guterres was able to secure the support of important 
Member States, above all the USA, China and Russia. 
In the eyes of many observers, the fact that the most 
powerful countries in the world are backing the 
reform plans makes the price seem acceptable: that 
in the future the chief position at the UN can also 
be claimed from the ranks of the P5. 
UN and USA: From Ambivalence to 
Reform Coalition 
That the Trump administration would usher in a new 
era of American UN policy was certainly one of the 
biggest surprises in international politics in recent 
years. Some experts speculated early on that there 
was a slight chance that Donald Trump could support 
a comprehensive reform of the world organisation.6 
For a long time, however, the impression dominated 
that the US would significantly reduce its UN involve-
ment. After all, Trump made it clear on several occa-
sions during the presidential election campaign how 
little respect he had for multilateral organisations in 
his foreign policy ideas. His slogan “America First” 
instead emphasised the priority of national sovereign-
ty. The words were followed by deeds: Washington 
 
6 See Richard Gowan: “There is a small chance that Trump 
will be a passionate U.N. reformer”, quoted in “Trump’s U.N. 
Obsession Collides with Reality”, Politico, 19 September 2017, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/17/trump-
un-general-assembly-test-215614 (accessed 26 January 2018). 
Similar: “Has President Trump Learned to Love the United 
Nations?”, Foreign Policy, 3 May 2017, http://foreignpolicy. 
com/2017/05/03/has-president-trump-learned-to-love-the-
united-nations-nikki-haley/ (accessed 26 January 2018). See 
also Kevin Rudd, “UN Reform under the Trump Adminis-
tration: The Way Ahead”, The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 
(2017): 95–107. 
withdrew from the Paris Climate Convention, 
UNESCO, and the Human Rights Council. In addition, 
Nikki Haley, UN Ambassador of the Trump Adminis-
tration, announced that American contributions to 
the regular budget of the United Nations and to UN 
peacebuilding would be cut.7 
Compared with the UN policy of previous Repub-
lican-led governments, however, this was not a dra-
matic change of course. Already under President 
Ronald Reagan, the USA had left UNESCO in 1984; the 
administration of George W. Bush cancelled Ameri-
can contributions to some UN programs, for example 
in the area of women’s reproductive health. There 
have also been numerous precedents for a Repub-
lican-dominated Congress exerting financial pressure 
on the UN to achieve reforms or punish unwanted be-
haviour.8 The Trump government by and large 
echoed the conservative criticism of the United 
Nations; in this perception, the organisation is con-
sidered bureaucratic, inefficient and often hostile to 
America’s interests and allies.9 
What was striking, however, was that Trump him-
self apparently had an ambivalent attitude towards 
the UN. No matter how much he criticised the current 
state of affairs in New York, his remarks were always 
tinged with the great potential of the world organisa-
tion.10 And after his first appearance before the Gen-
 
7 The US currently contributes 22 percent to the regular 
UN budget and more than 28 percent of the budget ear-
marked for peacebuilding. See Elsina Wainwright, Profile 
in Prominence? Ambassador Nikki Haley and the Trump Adminis-
tration’s UN Policy (Sydney: United States Studies Centre at 
the University of Sydney, August 2017), https://www.ussc. 
edu.au/analysis/profile-in-prominence-ambassador-nikki-
haley-and-the-trump-administrations-un-policy (accessed 
26 January 2018). 
8 See Luisa Blanchfield, United Nations Reform: Background 
and Issues for Congress, CRS Report (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service [CRS], 15 May 2015). 
9 See Brett D. Schaefer, Eleven Priorities on International Orga-
nizations for the Trump Administration, Issue Brief, no. 4628 
(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 17 November 
2016); Josef Braml, “Amerikas Forderung nach UN-Refor-
men”, Vereinte Nationen 66, no. 1 (2018): 9–14. 
10 So said Trump in April 2017 after a meeting with the 
UN ambassadors of the Security Council members: “I also 
want to say to you that I have long felt the United Nations 
is an underperformer but has tremendous potential”, quoted 
in “Remarks by President Trump at a Working Lunch with 
U.N. Security Council Ambassadors”, 24 April 2017, https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
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eral Assembly in 2017, Trump developed an interest 
in the UN that surprised many observers (and prob-
ably also himself). One banal reason for this was cer-
tainly the President’s deep attachment to his home-
town New York, the seat of the world organisation. 
That many governments reacted positively to his 
maiden speech in which he emphasised the impor-
tance of national sovereignty for peace, security and 
prosperity modified his image of the UN as a “hoard 
of globalists”. Moreover, Trump was flattered that in 
the absence of other world leaders such as Xi Jinping, 
Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel, international 
attention focused largely on him.11 
Trump justified his criticism of the UN by saying 
that the American taxpayers would receive a “bad 
deal” for their investment. The reasons for this in-
clude a lack of accountability and inefficient organi-
sational structures. Guterres saw quite similar chal-
lenges.12 Bureaucracy, institutionalised selfishness 
and incompetence in the UN system robbed him of 
his sleep at night, he said during a joint appearance 
with Trump at the beginning of the 2017 General 
Assembly.13 At this event, both were talking about 
the need for comprehensive reform that must lead to 
leaner structures and more efficient organisation so 
 
president-trump-working-lunch-u-n-security-council-
ambassadors/ (accessed 26 January 2018). 
11 “Trump Relishing World’s Attention at U.N.”, Politico, 
20 September 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/ 
20/trump-united-nations-2017-242936 (accessed 31 January 
2018). 
12 See Richard Gowan: “Meanwhile, the UN has a new 
secretary-general, António Guterres, who is bent on making 
the organization leaner and more efficient – and whose 
reform agenda unexpectedly overlaps with the president’s”, 
quoted in Can Trump and the United Nations Just Get Along? 
(Washington, D.C.: Century Foundation, 14 September 2017), 
https://tcf.org/conent/report/can-trump-united-nations-just-
get-along/ (accessed 28 January 2018). See also Tanja Bern-
stein, Die ersten 100 Tage: António Guterres als Generalsek-retär der 
Vereinten Nationen, ZIF Policy Briefing (Berlin: ZIF, April 2017). 
13 See Janine di Giovanni: “Guterres has managed to blunt 
Trump’s institution-busting instincts by harnessing them to 
his own ambitions for reform. Guterres, observers say, sold 
Trump and Haley on the idea of a leaner, more efficient 
U.N., a management goal that appealed to Trump’s lifelong 
dislike for layers of bureaucracy”, quoted in “The U.N.’s Most 
Important Peacekeeping Mission: Trump”, Politico, 21 January 
2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/21/ 
antonio-guterres-most-important-peace-keeping-mission-
216489 (accessed 28 January 2018). 
that the potential of the UN can unfold.14 More 
than 130 states, whose representatives wanted to 
be present at this event, declared their support in a 
declaration on the need for significant reforms.15 
Converging Interests: 
China and Russia on Board 
America’s new interest in the UN is not only due to 
Trump’s appreciation of the big stage in New York. 
Tangible political considerations also play a role. 
The UN has an important function in legitimising the 
cooperation of other states with Washington. China, 
for example, would find it considerably more difficult 
to support sanctions against North Korea if they were 
decided on outside the UN. Although the impulsive 
Trump has little understanding of the intricate paths 
of the negotiating machine at East River, UN Am-
bassador Haley manages to keep the Security Council 
together against Pyöngyang. And Trump is wise 
enough to realise that in the end the result counts 
more than the process. 
China and Russia are supporting the 
US in securing its influence in the UN. 
The same is true of the Guterres reforms. They 
have a chance of success because they are supported 
 
14 Trump said: “Make the United Nations great. Not again. 
Make the United Nations great. Such tremendous potential, 
and I think we’ll be able to do this”, quoted in “Trump 
Pushes Reform in United Nations Debut, Calls for ‘Changing 
Business as Usual’”, The Washington Post, 18 September 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/ 
09/18/trump-pushes-reform-in-united-nations-debut-calls-for-
changing-business-as-usual/?utm_term=.5bc5bb04e3ee (ac-
cessed 26 January 2018). See also “Donald Trump Extends 
Hand to UN While Urging Reform”, Financial Times, 18 Sep-
tember 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/a4cf81a2-9c87-
11e7-8cd4-932067fbf946 (accessed 31 January 2018). 
15 See “Political Declaration for UN Reform High Level 
Event”, quoted in “Trump Takes on a New Cause: ‘Make 
the United Nations Great’”, Politico, 18 September 2017, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/18/trump-united-
nations-2017-make-united-nations-great-242842 (accessed 
21 January 2018). Invitations to this event were distributed 
by the American UN mission in cooperation with China, 
Germany, UK, India, Japan and Canada, among others. See 
also Richard Ponzio and Michael Schroeder, Hitting the Reset 
on the UN?, Stimson Spotlight (Washington, D.C.: Stimson 
Center, 18 September 2017). 
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by the powerful and influential UN states. The fact 
that the American administration under Trump 
thinks in categories similar to China’s and Russia’s 
foreign policy ideas proves to be advantageous for 
the formation of a common position.16 The principles 
shared by Beijing and Moscow include sovereignty, 
non-interference in the affairs of other states and 
the primacy of national interests over international 
cooperation. 
For China and Russia, cooperation with the USA 
is also attractive because it offers an opportunity to 
counter the growing demands of the General Assem-
bly and international civil society for more influence 
in the UN. The selection process to succeed Ban Ki-
moon, Secretary-General from 2007–2016, is a cau-
tionary example from this perspective. Due to pres-
sure from many member states and NGOs, the process 
was not conducted behind the closed doors of the 
Security Council, but in (global) public for the first 
time. More than ten candidates answered the ques-
tions of state and non-state actors. Eventually, it was 
the Security Council that proposed an applicant for 
the office, as provided for in the UN Charter. But 
Russia and China made their displeasure about the 
new process clear.17 Ultimately, greater transparency 
in the selection of candidates led to a counter-reac-
tion by the “Big Three” (China, Russia, USA). They 
feared their privileges would be restricted. Concerned 
about losing control, they took the initiative and 
agreed to support each other’s candidacies for the 
office of Secretary-General in the future. 
 
16 See Thomas Wright: “Trump’s continued use of the 
word sovereignty and his criticism of past U.S. presidents 
for violating it was surely music to Vladimir Putin and Xi 
Jinping’s ears. They have long argued for an international 
order that ‘respects’ their sovereignty as they define it: order 
organised around spheres of influence with a much smaller 
American role”, quoted in “Trump’s Indecisive, Ill-Prepared 
Debut at the United Nations”, The Atlantic, 20 September 
2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 
2017/09/trump-united-nations-iran-jcpoa-north-korea/540501/ 
(accessed 31 January 2018). 
17 See The UN Secretary-General Selection and Appointment 
Process: Emerging from the Shadows, Security Council Report, 
Research Report, 4 April 2017. 
Incentives and Sanctions Overcome 
Last Resistance 
With both carrots and sticks, the remaining resistance 
to the Guterres reforms can be overcome. Many Mem-
ber States’ approval is garnered by the fact that the 
various demands of long-standing supporters of re-
form are addressed. Nominating a woman as head of 
the world organisation proves a clever move; both 
within and outside the UN system, this is met with a 
great deal of applause. At the same time, it is planned 
to limit the Secretary-General’s term of office to five 
years in the future, to take greater account of the 
interests of the UN regional groups and of gender 
parity when filling top positions. The “Big Three” also 
promise to increase UN funding should the reforms 
be adopted. 
It is particularly relevant for non-state actors that 
Trump has managed to mobilise substantial sums 
of private capital. Led by Peter Thiel, one of Trump’s 
first supporters from Silicon Valley, a “Circle of UN 
Friends” is created in 2020 to mark the 75th anniver-
sary of the United Nations.18 The site of the event is 
San Francisco, the founding site of the world organi-
sation, and conveniently close to Silicon Valley. Thiel 
is anything but undisputed among business tycoons, 
but the perspective of an assertive UN fascinates quite 
a few of the already philanthropically committed 
entrepreneurs. They therefore overcome their reserva-
tions about the political success of the Trump admin-
istration, which most of them oppose. As a result, a 
Multi-Billion-Dollar support fund is set up; the UN, 
the private sector and civil society will jointly decide 
on the priorities for funding.19 
The “Big Three” are prepared to sanction possible 
resistance to the reform plans politically and finan-
cially. However, they are met with little protest at the 
General Assembly. It appears that for many Member 
States an UN system dominated by this triumvirate is 
acceptable as long as funds flow and political inter-
 
18 See Jason Miklian, “The Future of Business, Peace and 
Human Rights in the Donald Trump Era”, Global Policy, 6 
February 2017, http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/06/ 
02/2017/future-business-peace-and-human-rights-donald-
trump-era (accessed 26 January 2018). 
19 The role model for this private sector initiative is Ted 
Turner, founder of CNN, who donated a billion dollars in 
1997 to support UN goals and programs. See also Stacy Wil-
liams, “Billion Dollar Donation: Should the United Nations 
Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth?”, Georgia Journal of Inter-
national and Comparative Law 27, no. 2 (1999): 425–55. 
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ventions in internal affairs – broadly understood – 
are omitted. With the energetic support of a group of 
“sovereign democracies” led by India and Turkey, the 
reform package is adopted by the 75th General As-
sembly in 2020. Public gainsaying has recently come 
from only a few countries in the Global South and 
some EU members. Guterres’ personal price consists 
of the renunciation of a second term in office. As a 
result, the USA nominates its candidate in summer 
2021, and is supported by China and Russia. Follow-
ing the well-known dictum “Only Nixon could go to 
China”, the media now say: “Only Trump could go 
to New York.” 
Effects and Possibilities for Action 
Given such a situation, Germany would be faced with 
a dilemma. On the one hand, Berlin has advocated 
UN reforms for a long time and could hardly stand 
on the sidelines if they were seriously pursued. On 
the other hand, Germany favours multilateralism as 
an approach to shaping international policy and 
would be highly critical if the UN were plurilateral-
ised. However, Berlin continually loses partners. 
Brexit strengthens London’s interest in the Security 
Council. Domestic issues dominate in Paris. The G4 
partners (Brazil, India and Japan) are either also 
absorbed by domestic policies or face foreign and 
security policy challenges for which they need 
Washington’s support. 
Berlin should press for 
the modernisation of 
UN working methods. 
Germany also has a strong interest in stable inter-
national relations. Berlin should therefore play an 
active role in the reform debate promoted by Guterres 
and, above all, urge that the UN’s working methods 
be thoroughly modernised. This could include, for 
example, enabling the organisation as a whole, and 
the Security Council in particular, to respond appro-
priately and at an early stage to emerging crisis devel-
opments. This would include the Security Council 
members being regularly briefed by the UN system 
on potential crises (horizon scanning).20 
 
20 This could be linked to the guidelines of the Federal 
Government “Preventing crises, overcoming conflicts, pro-
moting peace” (Berlin, 2017). 
An “unfriendly takeover” of the UN would prob-
ably entail a whole cascade of rebalancing power and 
influence in all kinds of international forums and 
bodies. Germany and the EU should, if necessary, 
reach an early agreement on where they want to set 
a course in terms of issues and personnel. To this end, 
it would be worthwhile to consider more than Ber-
lin’s well-known political priorities in the UN such 
as climate change, environment and development, 
management of international migration, or imple-
mentation of Agenda 2030. 
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South Korea’s newly elected President Hong Jun-pyo 
commemorates Korea’s Independence Day on August 
15, 2022 by dropping a bombshell.1 He declares that 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) will withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Joint 
Declaration (of the two Koreas) on the denuclearisa-
tion of the peninsula on 20 January 1992 would no 
longer be binding. President Hong justifies the step 
with the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear and conventional arms 
build-up represents a “threat to South Korea’s su-
preme interests”.2 For a credible deterrent, the South 
needs its own nuclear weapons. 
To the astonishment of the world, President Hong 
also announces that in recent years South Korean 
nuclear scientists have already separated a significant 
amount of weapons-grade plutonium as part of a 
secret reprocessing programme. This was done with 
the tacit approval of the previous government under 
President Moon Jae-in. Just five days later, South Korea 
conducts an underground nuclear test and tests a 
newly developed short-range missile that can reach 
targets throughout North Korea.3 
 
1 The leader of the conservative Liberal Korea Party came 
into office on a second attempt with an overwhelming 
majority, after losing to Moon Jae-in in the previous presi-
dential elections in 2017. 
2 According to Article 10 of the NPT, each party is entitled 
to withdraw from the treaty “if it decides that extraordinary 
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeop-
ardised the supreme interests of its country”. Such a with-
drawal shall be notified three months in advance. 
3 South Korea has large reserves of plutonium in spent fuel 
rods from its civil nuclear energy programme. Basically, this 
plutonium can also be misused for military purposes after 
separation. South Korea masters the necessary reprocessing 
technology for this purpose, see Zachary Keck and Leon 
Whyte, “Can South Korea Build a Nuclear Bomb in 6 Months?”, 
The National Interest (online), 22 September 2017, http:// 
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/can-south-korea-build-
South Korea’s shift towards a nuclear weapons 
capability does not happen out of the blue. During 
the previous years, those who wanted to maintain the 
goal of a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula and 
trusted the US extended deterrent had found them-
selves increasingly on the defensive. This was due, 
on the one hand, to North Korea’s proven capacity for 
a nuclear strike against the United States and, on the 
other, because of growing doubts about America’s 
commitment to the security alliance with Seoul. 
An Outsider Position Becomes 
Political Mainstream 
Amongst the public, the media and within the con-
servative opposition parties of South Korea, a funda-
mental change of mood and opinion had taken place 
over a few years. In South Korea, being in favour of 
becoming a nuclear weapon state had always been an 
outsider position due to the costs and risks associated 
with such a step. But it became a mainstream attitude 
during the term of office of President Moon Jae-in 
(2017–2022), even though the president remained 
committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free Ko-
rean peninsula. Many South Koreans saw the dilemma 
of being vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Pyong-
yang on the one hand, and potentially becoming the 
collateral victim of a US military strike against North 
Korea on the other, as the return of a situation that 
was traumatic for the nation. Foreign capitals should 
“never again” be in a position to make a decision to 
go to war that might risk the loss of national sover-
 
nuclear-bomb-6-months-22437; Jungmin Kang and Frank 
von Hippel, “Reprocessing Policy and South Korea’s New 
Government”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (online), 15 May 
2017, https://thebulletin.org/reprocessing-policy-and-south-
korea%E2%80%99s-new-government10768 (accessed 12 
November 2017). 
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eignty, as the country had experienced under Japa-
nese colonial rule. This could only be prevented 
through the possession of nuclear weapons. As the 
most credible representative of this position, Hong 
Jun-pyo was elected President of the ROK by an over-
whelming majority in May 2022. 
North Korea had fuelled the debate about nuclear 
weapons in the southern part of the peninsula in 
2017 and 2018 with two underground hydrogen bomb 
test explosions and several intercontinental missile 
tests. Additionally, the DPRK demonstrated its nuclear 
second strike capability in the summer of 2019 with 
a series of three atmospheric atomic tests over the 
Pacific. The last test was carried out using a nuclear 
warhead on a long-range missile that flew over Japan 
and detonated 2000 kilometres east of Hawaii at an 
altitude of 50 kilometres in the atmosphere, without 
major environmental contamination.4 However, the 
electromagnetic pulse triggered by the detonation 
damaged the electronics of several ships.5 In a pre-
vious missile test, North Korea had already demon-
strated the ability to deploy nuclear weapons from 
outside its territory by launching KN4 medium-range 
missiles from a submarine. 
The initial reaction of the USA and the international 
community to Pyongyang’s escalation followed famili-
ar patterns. While the United Nations Security Coun-
cil unanimously condemned the North Korean tests 
and once again decided to tighten sanctions, the 
Trump administration reaffirmed America’s commit-
 
4 Such nuclear tests, in which nuclear warheads are de-
livered by missiles, are rare, but have already taken place 
several times. China tested a warhead atmospherically on 
a DF-2 rocket on 27 October 1966, two years after its first 
nuclear test. This experiment should probably demonstrate 
the operational capability of Chinese nuclear weapons, 
see “DF 2 – China Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American 
Scientists (online), 21 October 2016, http://fas.org/nuke/guide/ 
china/theater/df-2.htm (accessed 1 November 2017). The 
Soviet Union and the USA also carried out tests in which 
carrier systems and warheads were jointly tested. At the end 
of September 2017, North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong 
Ho threatened that North Korea could test a hydrogen bomb 
over the Pacific, see Joshua Berlinger and Zahra Ullah, 
“North Korea Could Test Hydrogen Bomb over Pacific, Says 
Country’s Foreign Minister”, CNN, 23 September 2017, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/21/politics/kim-jong-un-on-
trump-comments/index.html (accessed 12 November 2017). 
5 See William R. Graham, “North Korea Nuclear EMP 
Attack: An Existential Threat”, 38 North (online), 2 June 2017, 
http://www.38north.org/2017/06/wgraham060217/ (accessed 
12 November 2017). 
ment to its alliances with South Korea and Japan. US 
Secretary of Defence James Mattis travelled to South 
Korea. At the demarcation line in Panmunjon, he 
unmistakably reminded the North of his former 
warning that any military nuclear operation against 
the US or one of its allies would result in the end of 
its regime and the destruction of its people. 
Seoul fears Washington’s retreat 
under direct nuclear threat from 
North Korea. 
But then the lack of will on the part of the USA 
to follow through on its own pledges with actions 
caused frustration and anger in South Korea. Wa-
shington refused to re-deploy tactical nuclear weap-
ons in the ROK.6 In contrast to earlier confrontations, 
the United States refrained from demonstratively 
underpinning its alliance commitment through joint 
military manoeuvres or flights over the peninsula 
with B52 long-range bombers. In Seoul, this restrained 
behaviour was perceived as Washington’s retreat in 
the face of the direct nuclear threat from North Korea. 
But from South Korea’s perspective things would 
get worse. In mid-2020, isolationist voices gained 
influence in the US pre-election campaign. President 
Trump acquiesced and, under the slogan “Let’s dis-
entangle together!”, promised that if re-elected, 
America would focus on its own security. Referring to 
the existing strategic nuclear deterrent capacity of the 
United States, Trump announced that from now on 
North Korea would be deterred by the threat of mas-
sive nuclear retaliation. In order to regain the initia-
tive in the election campaign debates, he ordered a 
massive reduction in US troops stationed in South 
Korea and suspended the major exercise “Foal Eagle” 
for 2021, which had been carried out jointly with the 
ROK’s armed forces annually since 1997. Further-
more, he declared the THAAD missile defence system 
deployed south of Seoul obsolete and ordered its with-
drawal, while at the same offering to purchase or 
lease the system to Seoul. 
 
6 The USA had stationed tactical nuclear weapons in South 
Korea from 1958 to 1991, see Amy F. Woolf and Emma Chan-
lett-Avery, Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons to South Korea: Back-
ground and Implications in Brief, CRS Report R44950 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 14 November 
2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44950.pdf (accessed 14 No-
vember 2017). 
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In order to counter the nuclear 
threat from the North, South Korea 
needs its own nuclear weapons. 
South Korea’s government, opposition, civil society 
and media reacted with shock and bitterness to Ameri-
ca’s retreat and strongly criticised its ally. Anti-Ameri-
can mass demonstrations took place across the coun-
try. However, more and more empathetic voices 
joined the debate, arguing that South Korea needed 
to understand the changed American position. They 
called on South Korean politicians to finally take 
responsibility for national security and to end the 
“unworthy” dependency in security matters on a part-
ner who would turn out to be unreliable in a crisis 
situation. In order to counter the nuclear threat from 
the north on an equal footing, the country would 
need its own nuclear deterrent. 
South Korea’s public and media no longer supported 
President Moon’s goal of a comprehensive denucleari-
sation of the Korean peninsula. Moon’s phase-out of 
nuclear energy was broadly opposed due to the loss 
of income and the lowering of the competitiveness of 
the South Korean economy. In social networks, South 
Koreans suddenly referred to America’s atomic bomb-
ings of Japan positively, pointing out that these at-
tacks quickly ended the Pacific War and helped to 
liberate Korea. In regular surveys conducted by the 
daily Joong Ang Ilbo, at least 80 percent of the popu-
lation were now in favour of nuclear weapons.7 
The conservative opposition achieved an absolute 
majority in the April 2020 parliamentary elections, in 
the run-up to which the Moon Jae-in government had 
continued to advocate a nuclear-weapon-free South 
Korea. The election winners interpreted the result 
as a vote for nuclear weapons. After the re-election 
of Donald Trump as US President in November 2020, 
the representatives of this position were further 
strengthened. Against this background, the election 
of the conservative Hong Jun-pyo from the Liberal 
Korea Party as president of the ROK on 10 May 2022 
came as no surprise. The conservative programme 
of pursuing a hard line against North Korea and re-
 
7 According to a survey conducted by Gallup Korea in Sep-
tember 2016, 58 percent of those questioned had already 
advocated nuclear armament in South Korea, see “60% of 
S. Koreans Support Nuclear Armament: Poll”, Korea Times 
(online), 23 September 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ 
www/news/nation/2016/09/205_214598.html (accessed 
14 December 2017). 
gaining national capacity to act through a national 
nuclear deterrent proved to be a decisive factor for 
electoral success. 
Controversial Reactions 
The United States supported South Korea’s nuclear 
break-out. Reports appeared in the South Korean 
press that government representatives in Seoul had 
for years been sounding out Washington’s reaction 
to a crossing of the nuclear threshold. Apparently, 
they never met a clear rejection. 
In a Twitter message, President Trump praises 
South Korea for now taking deterrence into its own 
hands. In a joint declaration, foreign ministers of 
both sides explicitly declare their support for the 
bilateral defence alliance, but announce that treaties 
must be adapted to the new situation. Washington 
and Seoul would now closely coordinate their nuclear 
policies, as the US has already done with the NATO 
nuclear powers France and Britain.8 The Pentagon 
reaffirms that the US is maintaining its extended 
nuclear deterrent and defence commitment to its 
allies in North-East Asia without changes. 
Although the White House regrets in an official 
statement the damage that has been done to the NPT, 
it welcomes the gain in strategic stability in North-
East Asia. The statement refers to North Korea, but 
especially to China and its “provocative policy” of 
striving for “regional domination”. 
North Korea reacts cautiously to South Korea’s 
demonstration of a nuclear weapons capability. It 
tries to overcome its own isolation by accusing South 
Korea of flagrantly violating the NPT by developing a 
nuclear weapons option and secretly producing weap-
ons-grade fissile material. North Korea argues that its 
nuclear weapons serve only self-defence purposes and 
are directed solely against the USA.9 Anyone who un-
 
8 See Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, “Deterrence at 
Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation”, Survival 57, 
no. 4 (July 2015): 29–52. 
9 North Korea has already claimed on other occasions that 
its own nuclear weapons serve solely to deter the USA and 
would under no circumstances be used against other states, 
see for example Samuel Osborne. “North Korea Says It Needs 
Nuclear Missiles Capable of Striking Heart of US Mainland to 
Prevent Invasion”, Independent (online), 7 August 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korea-
intercontinental-missiles-us-strike-mainland-invasion-
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justifiably criticises Pyongyang’s self-defence meas-
ures would now primarily have to punish Seoul, 
which developed nuclear weapons without justifica-
tion or need. 
China strongly condemns South Korea’s nuclear 
break-out and announces measures to stop invest-
ment in and tourist travel to the ROK immediately. 
Beijing accepts neither North nor South Korean 
nuclear weapons and keeps the goal of a nuclear-
weapon-free peninsula. The day after the nuclear and 
missile tests, state press agencies call for a boycott of 
South Korean goods. In response to the Chinese sanc-
tions, the already weakening South Korean stock 
index KOSPI loses 40 percent of its value within a few 
days. The parallel decline in the value of the South 
Korean Won on the international currency markets 
can only be prevented by supportive interventions of 
the US Federal Reserve. 
Other neighbouring Asian countries also condemn 
South Korea’s step to become a nuclear weapons pos-
sessor, but refrain from imposing trade sanctions. In 
Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam, debates are beginning 
on whether nuclear weapons should be pursued, too. 
The UN General Assembly and the General Confer-
ence of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) condemn South Korea’s move and recommend 
sanctions. The Security Council, however, is unable to 
agree on sanctions because of a US veto. Washington 
argues that South Korean nuclear tests are “regret-
table” but “an act of self-defence” against the North 
Korean threat. Now it would be important for South 
Korea to act as a “responsible” nuclear power. “For 
this we need dialogue with our partners in Seoul, not 
knee-jerk decisions on sanctions”, said the US repre-
sentative to the United Nations, Richard Grenell. 
South Korea, for its part, threatens Europeans with 
economic countermeasures should they impose uni-
lateral sanctions. Hong Jun-pyo refers to the EU’s 
trade surplus with South Korea. During a meeting 
with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in London, 
he asks: “How do European companies want to main-
tain their competitiveness without the purchase of 
powerful and cost-effective electronic components 
from Korea?” 
 
donald-trump-kim-jong-un-a7880606.html (accessed 14 De-
cember 2017). 
Courses of Action for the International 
Community and for Germany 
South Korea opted for nuclear weapons under the 
extreme condition of a specific nuclear threat and 
because it has concluded that it can no longer rely on 
the security guarantees of American protective power 
alone. The price for this step is high: Seoul accepts 
its international isolation and considerable economic 
costs. In return, it hopes to improve its security 
through national control over nuclear weapons. 
Such a development would be a new challenge for 
Germany and other international partners of South 
Korea. Previously, primarily autocratic states outside 
the Western community of values had sought weap-
ons of mass destruction. Now, a democratic country 
deeply integrated into the West is shaking the foun-
dations of the non-proliferation regime. 
Seoul should be clearly warned that 
Europe would respond to the 
development of a South Korean 
nuclear weapon with sanctions. 
Dealing with such a development is particularly 
difficult because sanctions against Europe’s fourth 
most important non-European trading partner would 
entail high economic costs. Sanctions would also 
involve a break with a partner that so far had always 
been reliable. On the other hand, a weak reaction 
by Western states to South Korea’s violation of global 
rules could significantly weaken or even destroy 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, should other 
nations decide to follow in South Korea’s footsteps. 
In order to avert such a catastrophic development, 
the international community, Germany and Europe 
should try to influence the calculations of the ROK 
at an early stage and on multiple levels. The more the 
South Korean population and elite perceive the devel-
opment of their own nuclear weapons to be without 
alternatives, the more difficult it becomes to prevent 
such a step. 
1) In order to reduce security pressure on Seoul, 
finding a political solution to the nuclear conflict 
with North Korea remains of paramount impor-
tance. An agreement on how to deal with Pyong-
yang’s nuclear programme could be reached pri-
marily through negotiations between the US and 
North Korea, involving South Korea and China. 
Germany and the EU can increase the likelihood 
of success by fully implementing the sanctions 
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regime against North Korea, including prosecution 
of the regime’s business middlemen and, where 
necessary, exerting economic pressure on third 
countries to do likewise. 
2) At the international level, Germany and Europe 
should work to strengthen the IAEA safeguards 
regime, especially in countries where development 
of nuclear weapons is debated. This could help 
to uncover clandestine work on relevant technol-
ogies.10 
3) Europe should engage in a dialogue with Seoul – 
and especially with South Korea’s conservative 
opposition which might win the presidential elec-
tions in 2022 – on security policy alternatives 
to the development of a nuclear deterrent. An 
exchange of experiences on the problems and 
dilemmas of nuclear deterrence policy in Europe 
during the Cold War could help to raise awareness 
about the risks of nuclear confrontation on the 
Korean peninsula. 
4) It is also important to press the United States for 
greater reliability of its security guarantees for 
South Korea. A dialogue between NATO and South 
Korea might be an appropriate framework for such 
a discussion. 
5) Once there is real concern that South Korea might 
be considering withdrawal from the NPT, Europe 
should clearly signal to Seoul that it would impose 
sanctions in response to the development of a 
South Korean nuclear weapon. At the very least, 
the EU should threaten the suspension of the Stra-
tegic Partnership and the Free Trade Agreement. 
Such threats of sanctions could and should be co-
ordinated with Beijing. 
6) Should South Korea nevertheless withdraw, then 
the EU can at least make it clear that formal recog-
nition of South Korea’s nuclear weapons status is 
impossible. South Korea’s exit from the NPT would 
probably lead to a collapse of the non-proliferation 
regime if international reactions are insufficient to 
deter imitators. 
 
10 South Korea conducted secret enrichment and 
reprocessing experiments in the late 1970s, early 1980s and 
1990s, which it should have declared to the IAEA. It was 
only in 2004 that the IAEA investigated this research and 
concluded that it had been discontinued, see Paul Kerr, 
“IAEA: Seoul’s Nuclear Sins in Past”, Arms Control Today 34, 
no. 10 (December 2004), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1714 (accessed 12 
November 2017). 
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2013 Key Messages, Methodological 
Approach and Implications 
The original article “Schöne Energiewelt: Die ‘Batte-
rie-Revolution’ vorantreiben”1 [“Beautiful Energy 
World: Promoting the Battery Revolution”] held a 
special position in the Foresight volume from 2013 
in that it focused on 2021, while other contributions 
envisaged a much shorter period of about four years. 
Furthermore, the article pursues the underlying 
assumption that the rapid achievement of climate 
and energy targets are desirable in normative terms. 
The EU has set itself several targets: an increase in the 
share of renewable energies in the energy mix to 20 
percent, an increase in energy efficiency of 20 per-
cent, a reduction in climate-damaging emissions of 20 
percent and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
of 80 to 95 percent to be achieved by 2050. Accord-
ingly, the strategic imperative of a consequent energy 
transformation is a leitmotif throughout the article. 
The main assumption is that to comprehensively con-
vert the energy system into a clean and innovation-
intensive system – which in turn requires a clear and 
consistent course for storage technologies, among 
other things – produces many benefits. 
The 2013 Foresight contribution formulated several 
key statements. Achieving a breakthrough in physical 
and chemical storage technologies would amount to a 
real revolution. An efficient storage technology would 
provide a previously missing component for decar-
bonising the energy system which could have disrup-
tive effects. The advantages of fossil fuels lie not only 
in their energy density, but also in the fact that these 
 
1 Kirsten Westphal, “Schöne Energiewelt: Die ‘Batterie-
Revolution’ vorantreiben”, in Ungeplant bleibt der Normalfall. 
Acht Situationen, die politische Aufmerksamkeit verdienen, ed. 
Volker Perthes and Barbara Lippert, SWP-Studie 16/2013 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2013), 
7–11. 
energy sources can be stored flexibly. Fluctuating 
sources such as sun and wind, which can be used 
virtually free of charge, could be “harvested” much 
better if the electricity generated from them could 
be stored longer and on a larger scale. In addition, the 
costs for grid expansion could be at least partly saved, 
because a balancing of supply and demand would 
take place, for example, via batteries or via the con-
version of electricity into heat and fuels (“power to X”). 
The 2013 article puts batteries at the centre of its 
analysis. On the one hand, the new possibilities for 
electricity storage are used to store excess electricity 
on site and are able to react flexibly to demand. On 
the other hand, electro mobility would pick up speed 
if the range of batteries improved. The strategic ad-
vantage of the internal combustion engine would be 
lost, too. 
The battery age offers enormous 
opportunities in terms of 
supply security, economy and 
climate compatibility. 
According to the view at that time, the benefits of 
a battery age would be enormous on several levels re-
garding the energy policy triangle of supply security, 
economic efficiency and climate compatibility. Since 
the proportion of domestic energy sources could be 
massively increased, supply security would be im-
proved. German politics could reaffirm the highly 
ambitious goals of the energy revolution propagated 
in 2011, not only with regard to the expansion of 
renewable energies, but also with regard to the reduc-
tion of climate-damaging gases. A renegotiation of the 
EU climate and energy targets in line with the Road-
map 2050 would also be easier in Brussels. The high 
payment transfers to the suppliers of fossil energy 
would gradually decrease, with immense effects on 
state budgets and trade balances. 
Kirsten Westphal 
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The contribution from 2013 has recourse to the 
narrative of the energy transition which emphasises 
the opportunities for growth offered by a restructur-
ing of the energy system. A revolution in batteries 
would strengthen Germany as an innovation-depend-
ent technological and industrial location and open up 
enormous export opportunities for German industry. 
Role of New Factors 
If we assess the article some years later – halfway to 
2021, so to speak – we must first ask to what extent 
the framework conditions and drivers have remained 
the same or changed and whether new ones have 
been added. 
Factor shale oil and gas. The article in 2013 already 
saw a decisive factor in the fracking boom in the USA 
that will increasingly influence energy policy deci-
sions and allow oil and gas consumption to continue. 
In defining “America First” and the guiding principle 
of energy dominance, the Trump administration 
relies primarily on fossil fuels. Overall, the USA is 
benefiting from increased domestic production and 
low energy prices, which are acting as a boost to the 
economy. Today, the oil and gas boom in the USA 
continues linearly. The impact on the oil and gas mar-
kets is far-reaching. 
Price erosion since mid-2014 and stabilisation attempts. 
The price of oil was almost40 percent lower in mid-
2018 than in 2013. The fall in prices was not antici-
pated in the article at that time and is primarily due 
to the fracking boom in the USA and the unexpectedly 
passive role of OPEC until the end of 2016. Despite 
lower prices, however, the supply of oil and natural 
gas in the USA (and elsewhere) has proved to be very 
stable and resilient. This was also made possible by a 
significant reduction in exploration and production 
costs. Even though the OPEC states and Russia agreed 
at the end of 2016 to limit production volumes and 
extended the agreement until the end of 2018, most 
observers expect moderate oil prices of USD 50 to 70 
per barrel in 2018/2019. Price increases are politically 
driven. The long-term costs caused by a fossil energy 
path, for example in the form of climate-damaging 
emissions, are still ignored. The supply risks resulting 
from geopolitical crises are also underestimated. 
There is therefore no incentive to switch to electro 
mobility. One consequence: emissions in Germany 
have risen for the third year in a row, and the main 
reasons for this are to be found in the transport sec-
tor. The relatively low gasoline prices are pushing 
up the number of sales of fuel-intensive cars such as 
SUVs. 
Diesel scandal and air pollution. A new factor is the 
scandal surrounding the incorrect data on emissions 
of nitrogen oxides (NOx), which has drawn attention 
to the diesel fleet. In many German cities, the thresh-
olds for fine dust and NOx are exceeded. Since 2013, 
the fight against increasing air pollution has become 
an increasingly important driver worldwide which 
has led China, for example, to convert its energy sys-
tem and drive forward storage solutions. 
Political and financial incentives 
remain necessary to develop, test and 
market strategic technologies. 
‘Securitisation’ of EU’s energy debate. Russia’s annexa-
tion of the Crimea and Moscow’s military destabili-
sation of eastern Ukraine triggered a security crisis in 
Europe. The EU’s energy debate is now dominated by 
security issues, as Russia is the Union’s most impor-
tant energy supplier. In the strategic triangle of ob-
jectives, security of supply has now become a crucial 
reference point for a number of member countries. 
This did not encourage a willingness to take bold 
innovative steps on the way towards the expansion of 
alternative energy generation and storage technology. 
The disagreement among EU member countries over 
the ambitions and objectives of climate and energy 
policy is also having an impact on national policies. 
Paris agreements and national climate action plans. The 
situation has finally become more complex with the 
Paris climate protection agreement which is based 
on voluntary national climate policy contributions 
(Nationally Determined Contributions). The EU mem-
ber countries have submitted a joint plan to limit 
global warming to two degrees above pre-industrial 
levels. This in turn requires a radical and rapid re-
structuring of the energy system and a redirection 
of investment flows. For this reason, Germany has 
formulated the electrification of the energy sectors 
and sector coupling as important goals in a national 
climate action plan in 2016. However, a rigid imple-
mentation is still lacking which would bring about a 
transformation in transport and heating sectors. 
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Are the Core Assumptions Still Valid? 
The 2013 Foresight article emphasised the relevance 
of political and financial incentives needed to devel-
op, test and market strategic technologies. Techno-
logical innovations determine the development of 
the system – usually by leaps and bounds, some-
times by chance. In 2013, researchers reported signifi-
cant progress in the capacities, lifetime, efficiency 
and environmental compatibility of physical and 
chemical storage technology. However, large scale 
deployment and marketability were still far from 
being achieved. Where does the world stand in 2018? 
The cost degression, which affects many energy 
sources, has not stopped at batteries. Costs have fallen 
by 40 percent since 20102, and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that they will fall by two 
thirds by 2040: from 700 US dollars per kilowatt hour 
today to less than 300 US dollars per kilowatt hour.3 
The lower battery costs are more likely to be reflected 
in longer ranges than in cheaper electric vehicles.4 
Sales of battery-powered and hybrid cars are grow-
ing rapidly. However, it would be premature to speak 
of a disruptive development, even if the number of 
new registrations worldwide in 2017 broke the sym-
bolic barrier of one million which corresponds to a 
share in the sale of all cars of over one percent.5 
There are three main markets for electrically 
powered vehicles: China, the USA and Europe, with 
China doubling registration rates in recent years and 
accounting for half of all new registrations worldwide 
in 2017.6 In the USA, sales continue to be sluggish, 
partly because some federal states have cut subsidies 
again. In Europe, Norway stands out above all. In 
2017 there were 605,000 new registrations in China, 
whereas Germany reported 54,000 new registrations 
– an increase that is still significantly lower than in 
other countries.7 
Investments in electric energy storage, which are to 
be used in distribution networks and charging sta-
tions for electric cars, have increased, but only amount 
 
2 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 
(Paris, 2017), 70. 
3 Ibid. 
4 IEA, World Energy Investment 2017 (Paris, 2017), 37. 
5 Steffen Bukold, Risk-Off Verkaufswelle in Energiemärkten, Stra-
tegien der Energiekonzerne weltweit, Trends in der Elektromobilität, 
Global Energy Briefing, 159 (Hamburg: Energy Comment, 
9 February 2018), 34. 
6 IEA, World Energy Investment 2017 (see note 4), 37. 
7 Bukold, Risk-Off Verkaufswelle (see note 5), 34/35. 
to just over three percent of all energy investments 
in 20168, with costs per stored megawatt hour (MWh) 
also falling significantly in the last five years. The USA 
was initially the leading investor, but has since been 
replaced by Korea, followed by Europe and Japan. 
At the end of 2017, the largest lithium-ion battery to 
date with a storage capacity of 100 MW/129 MWh was 
commissioned in South Australia. In Europe, the UK 
in particular has adapted its incentive and market 
system. The number and amount of investments in 
storage depends on whether the investments pay off 
and new business models can be implemented in the 
respective market. The prerequisite is that the system 
performance provided by the storage units is re-
warded. 
From learning curves to economies of scale. On the tech-
nological side, the introduction of batteries has gained 
momentum. The acceleration effect shifts away from 
learning curves and towards economies of scale. It is 
no longer enough to become or to be only a leading 
supplier; there must also be a sales market.9 In other 
words, the spread of battery technology is also in-
creasingly driven by the market. The trend of cost 
erosion will continue, but its pace and dynamics will 
be determined by the removal of market barriers and 
the adjustment of regulations. This applies, for exam-
ple, with regard to rules for the wholesale market and 
opportunities to compensate developers and investors 
for the system services they provide. 
Germany is not the nucleus of a battery revolution. The 
German automotive industry has relied for decades 
on the internal combustion engine, to whose produc-
tion Europe-wide supply chains contribute. For exam-
ple, the Foresight contribution of 2013 assumes that 
by 2021 ten percent of the approximately 43 million 
registered cars on Germany’s roads are electric cars 
and that they account for more than one third of all 
newly registered cars. Today it has to be acknowledged 
that the goal of bringing one million electric cars 
onto the road by 2020 will not be met. Thus the con-
clusion formulated in 2013 is still valid, and to an 
even greater extent, that “Germany and the EU [...] 
also have a lot to lose in terms of technology and in-
dustrial policy if they focus more on muddling through 
than on a fundamental modernisation of the infra-
structure and the energy system, while China is in-
vesting massively in electricity highways and the de-
 
8 IEA, World Energy Investment 2017 (see note 4), 51. 
9 Henning Kagermann, “‘Ich glaube nicht, dass Deutsch-
land abgehängt wird’”, Der Tagesspiegel, 9 May 2017, B1. 
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velopment of smart grids, but also batteries. China’s 
technological leadership in this area would have a 
lasting negative impact on the competitiveness of 
German and European industry in a field in which it 
is currently still the market leader.”10 Now it is much 
more likely that China and Korea will take the lead. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
The disruptive effect predicted by some observers has 
so far failed to materialise, but acceleration in the use 
of storage technologies can certainly be noted. From a 
German and European perspective, the establishment 
of battery cell production in Germany remains a stra-
tegic question.11 The future of Germany as an indus-
trial base and “car country” will also depend on 
whether Germany is in a position to produce lithium-
ion cells and thus to keep closed value chains in its 
own country, but also in the EU. The dependence 
on Asian suppliers (beyond the dependence on raw 
materials) should not become even greater. 
From today’s perspective, the value chains must 
therefore be taken even more into account in order to 
identify inertia forces, structural breaks and dynam-
ics. This is because the overall system is extremely 
sluggish and dependent on the paths already taken, 
partly because economic interests are tied to it. The 
combustion engine fits the industrial path chosen by 
Germany; battery solutions have not yet been able to 
open up any secondary paths. Openness to technology 
is important so that different approaches, such as 
potential production chains from natural gas to 
hydrogen-powered cars, can compete with batteries. 
At present, this secondary path would harmonise 
even better with existing industrial paths, petro-
chemical complexes and supply chains to filling 
stations in Germany. 
In the electricity sector, storage technologies offer 
solutions at various levels. They enable producers to 
store surplus electricity through on-site integration, 
or they offer end-consumers solutions “behind the 
meter”, such as electric cars, etc. Package solutions 
that offer practical applications for sector coupling, 
such as storing electricity or heat generated from 
renewable energy, play a special role. New informa-
tion technologies such as blockchain can autono-
 
10 Westphal, “Schöne Energiewelt” (see note 1), 10. 
11 “Elektrisch geladen mit ‘Terra E’”, Der Tagesspiegel, 9 May 
2017, B3. 
mously control supply and demand in a small, 
decentralised network. 
Whereas the technologies already exist, the great 
challenges and risks lie in the implementation. Fur-
thermore, investment cycles are shorter because 
innovations (also with a view to cost efficiency) take 
effect much faster. This also means that newcomers 
who offer integrated system solutions and/or fit into 
existing value chains have good chances of entering 
the market. Large domestic markets are an advantage 
here. The market conditions in Germany and the EU 
must therefore be adjusted accordingly and an indus-
trial and technological policy must be pursued that 
supports and accompanies the German and European 
industrial value-added networks in their restructur-
ing, such that money can be earned quickly with 
storage, and long-term business models can be estab-
lished. Germany and the EU have to catch up here. 
The EU Battery Alliance of February 2018 is an 
important step in this context. 
Value creation must gradually shift to 
the stage of providing end consumer 
energy, and the performance and 
reliability of the system must pay off. 
The conversion of the energy system and the shift 
to new paths requires government measures and 
specifications, just as much as the speed and radicalism 
needed for such a conversion. In a market economy, a 
dilemma occurs between the free play of markets and 
competition for the best technological solutions on 
the one hand, and the need to control energy trans-
formation on the other. Tracking several technology 
paths in parallel can be just as expensive as “mud-
dling through”. This dilemma is difficult to resolve, 
but what is needed is for those in positions of politi-
cal responsibility to make a conscious choice of prior-
ities. In any case, clear framework conditions are 
indispensable for consistent restructuring. Value crea-
tion must gradually shift to the level of system per-
formance and reliability as well as to the provision of 
end-consumer energy in order to provide the neces-
sary incentives for the introduction of flexible storage. 
Volatility and constant readjustment are both expen-
sive and hinder innovation rather than promoting it. 
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In January 2013, then Prime Minister David Cameron 
announced a change of strategy in British European 
policy that is now considered historic. In the event 
of his re-election, he wanted to renegotiate Britain’s 
position in the European Union (EU) – and then let 
British citizens vote whether to remain in the EU. The 
possibility that Great Britain would actually leave the 
EU – the word Brexit had just been born – was ini-
tially regarded as rather small in Germany. Too many 
uncertainties still stood in the way: first, Cameron 
had to win the 2015 parliamentary elections; second, 
he needed a majority in parliament for the referen-
dum; third, he had to negotiate with the EU; and 
finally, the British had to vote by a majority against 
Britain remaining in the EU. 
Despite, or precisely because of these uncertainties, 
the scenario of Brexit was a fascinating challenge for 
SWP Foresight in 2013.1 Looking at the actual course 
of the Brexit process so far, it is clear that many com-
plexities and conflicts were foreseen in the 2013 analy-
sis. However, what is also evident is that secondary 
political effects, in particular the continuous divisions 
within the UK government, were assessed differently 
back then, and had an additional impact on Brexit. 
Looking Back: The Main Developments 
Accurately Anticipated 
Brexit was not an industrial accident. Even if the ref-
erendum of 23 June 2016 had a narrow result of 52 to 
 
1 Nicolai von Ondarza, “Brüssel und London vor dem 
Scheidungsanwalt: Das Management eines britischen EU-
Austritts”, in Ungeplant bleibt der Normalfall. Acht Situationen, 
die politische Aufmerksamkeit verdienen, ed. Volker Perthes and 
Barbara Lippert, SWP-Studie 16/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2013), 16–19. 
48 percent – strikingly similar to our scenario – 
the conflict lines in British society on EU issues had 
already emerged long before.2 The experience of the 
European debt crisis, but above all the high level of 
immigration from other EU countries, coupled with 
the reporting by the traditionally EU-critical media, 
had significantly reduced support for EU member-
ship.3 Just how controversial the question of EU mem-
bership in British society was became obvious from 
the fact that the lines of conflict ran across party lines: 
EU opponents such as Boris Johnson and “moderate” 
EU sceptics such as David Cameron, who belonged to 
the same (conservative) party, stood on opposite sides 
during the referendum election campaign. There 
were also (fewer) Brexit supporters in the opposition 
Labour Party; and while Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn 
publically spoke out half-heartedly in favour of re-
maining in the EU, he has been a long-time critic of 
European integration and voted against remaining 
during the 1975 referendum on British membership 
of the then European Economic Community (EEC). 
Still, the unexpected referendum result threw the 
political system of the UK into a tailspin. Not only 
did Prime Minister David Cameron resign in the days 
after the referendum, but the leaders of the Brexit 
campaign Boris Johnson and Michael Gove also with-
drew from the competition for leadership of the Con-
servative Party and thus for the office of Prime Minis-
ter. Nigel Farage in turn gave up the leadership of the 
 
2 The assumption in the 2013 Foresight Analysis was a 50.7 
percent vote for the withdrawal from the EU. Indeed, before 
the Brexit referendum, there were several polls predicting 
a victory for those in favour of Leave, while the majority ex-
pected a Remain victory, though within the margin of error. 
3 See Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin and Paul White-
ley, “Why Britain Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level 
Analysis of the 2016 Referendum Vote”, Parliamentary Affairs 
10, no. 3 (2017): 439–64. 
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UK Independence Party (UKIP). A politician who had 
(cautiously) spoken out in favour of remaining in the 
EU, former Interior Minister Theresa May, became 
Prime Minister. This was followed, inter alia, by the 
landmark ruling of the British Supreme Court, estab-
lishing parliamentary co-determination in the exit 
process, the new elections announced in 2017 by 
Prime Minister May, which she lost, whereupon she 
was forced to form a minority government with the 
Northern Irish DUP; the cracks in the special relation-
ship with the US under the new US President Donald 
Trump; and the reorientation of Labour under former 
party rebel Jeremy Corbyn – truly, a very turbulent 
period in British politics.4 
Against this surprising backdrop, the key messages 
of the Brexit-Foresight of 2013 stand up astonishingly 
well when compared to actual developments. The 
profound division in the Conservative Party was clearly 
discernible at the time. Originally, Cameron had 
called the referendum to bridge the deep rifts in his 
party that existed between supporters of different 
positions on the EU issue, especially given the pres-
sure of 2013/14 polls showing UKIP at their peak. 
As suggested in the 2013 article, the rift between 
“Remain” and “Leave” still pierces right through the 
Conservative Party. This leads to a volatile situation 
whereby British Prime Minister Theresa May is under 
pressure either from the tough opponents of the EU, 
who want a clean break with the Union to maximise 
British sovereignty, or the supporters of a “soft” Brexit, 
who envisage remaining in the internal market and 
the customs union. Just in 2017/18, six of May’s 
senior ministers resigned, inter alia the Foreign Minis-
ter, the Defence Minister, the Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union and the Home Secretary. 
Above all, it has been confirmed 
that Brexit is not an event but a 
complex and lengthy process 
potentially stretching into the 2020s. 
Above all, however, the second core statement has 
been confirmed: the withdrawal process is complex 
and lengthy. In the public debate before and after the 
referendum, Brexit was regarded, and not only within 
Great Britain, as a single event, as a step that could 
be taken after the referendum that would result in an 
 
4 For an overview of political developments in the UK since 
the Brexit referendum, see Tim Shipman, Fall Out. A Year of 
Political Mayhem (London: William Collins, 2017). 
immediate change of circumstances. However, as 
early as 2013, the analysis of the withdrawal pro-
cedure under Article 50 of the EU Treaty (TEU) 
showed that Brexit is much more a process that will 
take many years – a process in which Great Britain 
cannot leave the EU immediately after its announce-
ment of withdrawal, but must first negotiate a with-
drawal agreement with the Union within two years. 
For example, nine months passed post-referendum 
until the UK formally submitted its withdrawal re-
quest, and it is now on course to leave the EU on 29 
March 2019. If the transition phase – during which 
the UK has committed itself to remaining bound by 
EU rules – is included, the Brexit process will (as ex-
pected in 2013) continue until well after 2020.5 
Thirdly, the Brexit negotiations regime, in which 
the EU-27 deal with the UK as if it is already a third 
country, has also been confirmed. Unlike the recon-
ciliation of interests within the EU, the Brexit talks do 
not take place between 28 equal states. Rather, the EU 
Commission, with a mandate from the EU-27, nego-
tiates with the UK with one voice. This has also con-
tributed to the fact that – contrary to expectations 
in 2013 – the UK has (so far) not yet succeeded in 
dividing the 27 EU states. Rather, the 22 members of 
the British cabinet are more split on Brexit than the 
27 EU members. 
This division is also due to the many conflicting 
goals confronting Great Britain. While parts of the 
Conservative Party, such as former Foreign Minister 
Boris Johnson, continue to pursue a “have the cake 
and eat it” strategy – i.e. wanting full free access to 
the EU internal market without being subject to the 
obligations of EU members – it was clear as early as 
2013 that the Brexit negotiations were also about the 
future of European order.6 Any new cooperation be-
tween the EU-27 and Britain will fit into the existing 
network of relations which the Union has with other 
third countries. As expected at the time, the EU-27 are 
not prepared to offer London more favourable market 
access than other partners, as the integration of the 
EU’s internal market with its four freedoms and its 
decision-making autonomy remain their top prior-
ities. 
 
5 See Nicolai von Ondarza, The Trouble with Transition. No 
Off-the-shelf Arrangement for the UK after Brexit, SWP-Comment 
54/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 
2017). 
6 Von Ondarza, “Brüssel und London vor dem Scheidungs-
anwalt” (see note 1), 18. 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
SWP Berlin 
Foresight 2018 
September 2018 
42 
The ability of the British government 
to make strategic miscalculations 
was underestimated. 
It has also been confirmed that Brexit will have 
consequences for the future development of the EU 
beyond the actual withdrawal. More than 85 percent 
of the EU’s GDP will be concentrated in the 19 euro 
states after Brexit. This raises the question of how the 
relationship can be structured between the Eurozone 
and non-euro countries in an EU 27. Indeed, the re-
form of the Eurozone is therefore just as much on the 
EU agenda as the parallel negotiations on Brexit. In 
this respect, the EU-27 has so far succeeded politically 
in keeping the two reform processes separate. 
The Secondary Political Effects Were 
Underestimated 
Overall, the assumptions about the fundamental 
interests of the EU-27 and Great Britain were thus 
retrospectively confirmed. This was also true of the 
procedural requirements of Article 50 TEU, which 
structured the Brexit process despite the severe politi-
cal turbulence expected in 2013. However, the con-
sequences of this political turbulence and the sec-
ondary political effects of the Brexit vote were under-
estimated. Three developments deviate particularly 
clearly from the Foresight scenario of 2013: 
The upheavals in the British political system, 
which has still not found a convincing response to 
the contradiction between Parliament’s absolute 
sovereignty and the fact that a referendum which 
is actually legally non-binding has dominated the 
British political debate since June 2016. Not only were 
the early elections in June 2017 almost exclusively 
overshadowed by Brexit, but the almost complete 
collapse of UKIP and the ongoing disputes within the 
Conservative Party are also due to Brexit.7 It was 
likely in 2013 that an EU withdrawal would be a 
complex matter. However, it is surprising how much 
the British government is negotiating Brexit with 
itself due to internal power struggles, and is thus still 
far from a clear negotiating strategy more than two 
years after the referendum. Equally important, the 
article underestimated the British government’s 
ability to make strategic miscalculations, further 
 
7 See Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon, Brexit and British 
Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2017). 
weakening its negotiating position. This includes in 
particular the decision to allow the two-year period of 
Article 50 to begin without prior internal agreement 
on its own negotiating objectives, as well as Theresa 
May’s decision to call new unnecessary elections, 
which have cost the ruling Conservatives an absolute 
majority and made the Northern Irish Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) king maker, greatly increasing 
the complexity of the British-Irish border in Brexit 
negotiations. 
The EU-27’s common interest in 
preserving the Union has increased. 
The secondary political effects in the EU-27 have so 
far been the opposite of what had been expected. The 
2013 Foresight Analysis anticipated one of the biggest 
risks being conflicts between EU member states on 
how to deal with the withdrawal of the UK, with the 
possible consequence of a domino effect. This effect 
has (to date) not occurred. On the contrary: after the 
Brexit vote, approval of the EU has risen in many mem-
ber states. The common interest in maintaining the 
Union binds the 27 to a common goal despite their 
continued divisions on other issues, in particular mi-
gration and the reform of the Eurozone. Remarkably, 
this also applies to traditionally close partners of the 
UK such as Sweden, Denmark or Ireland, who have 
each clearly committed themselves to the internal mar-
ket and EU membership. Yet even more sceptical EU 
governments such as those in Poland or Hungary have 
unreservedly endorsed the EU’s position on the UK. 
The Republic of Ireland has been given an unex-
pectedly strong role in the Brexit negotiations. This 
is due to two factors. Ireland is particularly affected 
by Brexit, as it has the only (large) land border with 
Great Britain, which is of enormous political as well 
as economic importance for the peace process in 
Northern Ireland. The Irish Government has therefore 
launched a major diplomatic initiative after the Brexit 
vote to raise its concerns – keeping the Irish-British 
border open – in the Brexit negotiations. Further-
more, the other EU countries have made it clear that 
they are in solidarity with Ireland and are only pre-
pared to negotiate future economic relations or even 
sign the withdrawal agreement with Britain if London 
guarantees that the border with the Republic of Ire-
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land will remain open in all circumstances.8 How-
ever, this political guarantee – if maintained9 – 
clearly restricts Britain’s room for negotiation. The 
border can only be kept open if Northern Ireland 
continues to comply with the rules governing the EU 
customs union and internal market in key areas such 
as energy and food standards after its withdrawal 
from the EU. The “small” Ireland has thus become 
a decisive factor in the Brexit process thanks to the 
solidarity of the EU. 
A Fresh Look Ahead 
Almost two years after the British vote to withdraw 
from the EU, Britain’s future relationship with the EU 
remains an issue of great political, economic and, in 
some cases, personal consequence for many EU citi-
zens – and an issue that is fraught with great un-
certainty. 
A review of the 2013 Foresight analysis has shown 
that a careful study of the legal and institutional 
structures of EU processes can enable more realistic 
and appropriate assumptions about future develop-
ments. In this respect, it is likely that the road to 
Brexit will continue to be long. In accordance with 
the deadline set in Article 50 TEU, the UK is expected 
to formally leave the EU on 29 March 2019. Politically, 
both sides currently rule out any extension of the 
negotiating period, which would legally be possible. 
However, they are currently aiming for a transition 
phase of 21 months for the immediate period after 
this date. If the EU-27 continues to prevail, the UK is 
expected to remain fully bound by the rules of the 
internal market and the customs union, including 
 
8 Tony Connelly, Brexit and Ireland. The Dangers, the Oppor-
tunities, and the Inside Story of the Irish Response (Dublin: Penguin 
Ireland, 2017). 
9 Although the British Government has given the EU a 
political commitment to keep the border between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland open, it has so far re-
jected the Commission’s legal interpretation of the ‘back-
stop’ for the British-Irish border, which was politically 
agreed in December 2017. For that agreement, see para-
graphs 49 and 50 of European Commission, Joint Report from 
the Negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom 
Government on Progress during Phase 1 of Negotiations under Article 
50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s Orderly Withdrawal from the Euro-
pean Union (Brussels, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf. 
freedom of movement and the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice, until the end of the cur-
rent EU financial framework in December 2020. But 
by then London will no longer have a say in the EU. 
Only in this phase does the EU intend to conclude 
the agreement with the UK on its future relationship. 
But even this deadline would be extremely tight for a 
deep and comprehensive free trade agreement: for 
such agreements, not only the EU, but also countries 
such as the US or Australia, generally require be-
tween four and ten years. A further extension of the 
transition into the 2020s therefore remains possible. 
Within this general structure, the shape of Brexit 
will continue to be dictated by political turbulence, in 
particular in London. The continued divisions within 
both the Conservative and the Labour Party on Brexit, 
the weakness of Prime Minister May, the clash be-
tween the EU-27 demands and what the UK is willing 
to accept, and, not least, the time pressure from the 
Article 50 framework lead to great political uncertain-
ties, with increased opportunities for political miscal-
culations. From the perspective of June 2018, four 
scenarios are conceivable. 
The scenario of an “exit from Brexit” (1), in which 
the UK withdraws its application for withdrawal, is 
still difficult to imagine politically. Although EU poli-
ticians, such as Donald Tusk, President of the Euro-
pean Council, have repeatedly indicated that this door 
is open, the possibility continues to be diminished 
especially in the British Conservative Party by strong 
opponents of the EU. Above all, the opposition Labour 
Party led by Jeremy Corbyn accepts Brexit in principle 
and has voted in parliament both for the invocation 
of Article 50, and against continued single market 
membership of the UK. Even in the unlikely event of 
new elections, neither of the two major British par-
ties, with more than 85 percent of the electorate vot-
ing, is therefore likely to question the EU withdrawal 
itself. Moreover, the British electorate continues to 
be split roughly 50/50 on Brexit, with no sign of a sig-
nificant movement against EU withdrawal as of June 
2018. By the time serious economic consequences 
of Brexit become apparent, the UK will most likely 
already be in transition and thus formally outside 
of the EU. 
The scenario of a “permanent transition” (2), in 
which Great Britain and the EU-27 initially agree on 
a temporary transition regime, is more politically con-
ceivable. Although the United Kingdom would leave 
the EU and its institutions, it would in fact remain in 
the internal market and the customs union and pay 
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into the EU budget. Given the high economic costs 
that the next step away from the EU economic area 
would entail, this regime could also be extended. To 
do this, however, the British would have to accept 
implementing EU rules without having a say; this is 
the case in Norway, for example, within the frame-
work of the European Economic Area. In the long 
term, however, such a settlement is unlikely to be 
stable due to the ongoing domestic political conflicts 
in Great Britain. It is thus also not necessarily in the 
interest of the EU-27, as the British question would 
continue to remain on the table. 
In a third scenario, domestic conflicts in Britain 
would escalate and the tough EU opponents in the 
cabinet and Conservative Party who do not accept the 
EU’s conditions for an orderly Brexit would prevail. 
The resulting “disorderly Brexit” (3) would have enor-
mous economic consequences for Great Britain, but 
the EU-27 – for example with regard to Ireland 
or the EU budget – would not want it either. How-
ever, the likelihood of this scenario has decreased as 
the UK has made no sufficient preparations for a dis-
orderly Brexit. Consequently, in the first phase of 
Brexit negotiations the UK accepted almost all of the 
EU-27 conditions due to growing political and eco-
nomic pressure. 
This leaves a “European Special Relationship” (4) as 
the last scenario. It would come about if the EU-27 
and the UK managed to reach a deep and comprehen-
sive free trade agreement under the CETA model 
during the transition period and to settle on coopera-
tion in the area of internal and external security.10 
Agreed trade relations will, however, be far below the 
current level of access to the internal market and will 
not solve problems such as those linked to the Irish-
British border. Therefore, the conclusion of 2013 still 
applies in 2018: 
“When the withdrawal agreement is signed, no one 
will feel like celebrating. For the first time in its his-
tory, the EU has lost a member and suffered damage 
to its reputation in the negotiations. Britain had to 
learn that leaving the EU was not only not an easy 
economic step, but that the country has also lost in-
fluence politically. During the years of negotiations, 
even the greatest British EU sceptics have realised 
that the withdrawal will only lead to a different form 
 
10 Barbara Lippert and Nicolai von Ondarza, A European 
Special Relationship? Guiding Principles, Interests and Options for the 
EU-27 in the Brexit Talks, SWP-Comment 49/2016 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2016). 
of integration if Britain does not want to disconnect 
completely from the internal market and international 
cooperation with the EU”.11 
 
11 Von Ondarza, “Brüssel und London vor dem Schei-
dungsanwalt” (see note 1), 19. 
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Abbreviations 
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Develop-
ment Party; Turkey) 
APT Advanced Persistent Threat 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(Canada–EU) 
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s 
Party; Turkey) 
CNN Cable News Network 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s 
DUP Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland) 
EEC European Economic Community 
EES Exit-Entry-System 
EP European Parliament 
ETIAS European Travel Information and Authorisation 
System 
EU European Union 
EU-CERT EU Computer Emergency Response Team 
EU-LISA European Agency for the operational manage-
ment of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice 
EURODAC European Dactyloscopy 
FDI Foreign Direct Investments 
G4 Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GPPi Global Public Policy Institute (Berlin) 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) 
IEA International Energy Agency (Paris) 
Kfor Kosovo Force 
KOSPI Korea Composite Stock Price Index 
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement 
Party; Turkey) 
MW megawatt 
MWh megawatt hour 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NOx Nitrogen Oxides 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries 
OPM Office of Personnel Management (USA) 
P3 China, Russia and the U.S. 
P5 Permanent Five (the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council) 
PDF Portable Document Format 
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation 
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party) 
ROK Republic of Korea  
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SIRENE Supplementary Information Request at the 
National Entry 
SIS Schengen Information System 
SR Security Council of the UN 
SUV Sport Utility Vehicle 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UK United Kingdom 
UKIP UK Independence Party 
UN United Nations 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (Paris) 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
USD US dollar 
VIS Visa Information System 
WMDFZ Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone 
ZIF Center for International Peace Operations (Berlin) 
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